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EDMUND G. ROSS AS GOVERNOR OF
NEW MEXICO TERRITORY
A REAPPRAISAL

By

HOWARD

R.

LAMAR

NE evening in the early spring of 1889, Edmund G. Ross
invited the Territorial Secretary of New Mexico, George
W. Lane, in for a smoke by a warm fire. As they sat in the
family living quarters of the Palace of the Governors and
talked over the'day's events, it became obvious that the Gov- ,
ernor was troubled about something. Unable to keep still he
left his chair and paced the floor in silence. Finally he remarked: "I had hoped to induct New Mexico into Statehood."1
In those few words Ross summed up all the frustrations he
had experienced in his four tempestuous years as the chief
executive of New Mexico Territory.
,
So briefly, or hostilely, has his career as governor been reported-both in the press of his own time and in the standard
histories of New Mexico-and so little legislation is associated
with his name, that one learns with genuine surprise that he
had been even an advocate of statehood. Marion Dargan, in
his study of the New Mexican statehood struggles, remarks
that L. Bradford Prince was the only governor between 1851
and 1890 to work for admission into the Union. 2 It is ironic,

O

1. Lillian Ross Leis, "Memoirs of Edmund G. Ross." Typescript in, the Edmund
Gibson Ross Papers in the Archives Division of the New Mexico State Records Center
(Santa Fe). The author is grateful to Dr. Myra Ellen Jenkins, Chief Archivist, for permission to use the Ross Papers. and for many valuable suggestions concerning the writing
of this article.
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indeed, that Ross, who was by career a newspaper editor and
a devoted believer in the press as an instrument of truth,
should have been so consistently its victim throughout his
own public career.
Edmund G. Ross owes his place in American history-and
a very respectable place it is-to his dramatic and stubborn
refusal as a Kansas Senator to vote for Andrew Johnson's
impeachment in 1868. After that painful moment he was a
ruined man politically, excoriated by the national Republican
press as a traitor to his party and accused of corruption and
bribery. He was denounced even more by his constituents
back in Kansas, for they had directed him by letter and memorial to vote with the Radicals against J ohnson.3
This bitter experience forced Ross to return to the Democratic party, which he had left as early as 1844 in order to
satisfy his strong anti-slavery convictions. Belonging to the
minority party in Republican Kansas, it was impossible for
him to emerge from the .political shadows again until the
Democrats returned to national power with Grover Cleveland's victory in 1884. The news that Cleveland had appointed
Ross governor of New Mexico Territory aroused much of the
old newspaper bitterness; and some of the senators, with
Ross' defection still vivid in their memories, were so determined to defeat his nomination that the Kansan had been de
facto governor for a year before the Senate confirmed his
appointment. 4
If Ross was the target of unfair national criticism and
calumny in 1868, he was equally the victim of a legend which
had grown up around him in the succeeding eighteen' years.
Gradually realizing that his vote for Johnson had not Qeen
the result of a corrupt bargain, the public had come instead
2. Marion Dargan, "New Mexico's Fight for Statehood, 1895-1912," New Mexico
HistO'Tical Review, XIV (January, 1939), p. 5.
3. This portion of Ross' career has been sympathetically covered in some detail in
Senator John F. Kennedy's Profiles in C01Lrage (N.Y., 1956) ; see also "Edmund Gibson
Ross" in the Dictionary of American Biography, ·XVI, PP. 175-176. For Ross' own
account of the trial see his HistO'TY of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President
of the United Sta.tes by the House of Representatives and his Trial by the Senate fO'T
High Crimes and Misdemean07's in Office, 1868 (Santa Fe, 1896).
4. Ross was appointed May 27, 1885, and received Senate confirmation on April 29,
1886. Earl S. Pomeroy, The TerritOries and the United States, 1861-1890 (Philadelphia,
1947), p. 110.
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to regard Ross' as an honorable man but so stubborn, opiniqnated, and idealistic, that he was difficult to work with. They
had also come to regard him as a reformer. And to complete
the stereotype-although he was only fifty-nine years old
when he became governor of New Mexico-the newspapers
persistently pictured him as an elderly man in broken health,
bowed by time and misfortune, more cantankerous and bitter
than wise. The Denver Opinion's description of him is fairly
typical of most papers: "an aged and obscure man with a
sallow, hungry countenance and thin faded hair." The Star
and Kansan called him, "that physically puny man."5
These were the basic elements of a newspaper portrait of
Ross which was to be peddled daily during his governorship
(1885-1889) by the local 'press, and particularly by Ross'
political enemy, Colonel Max Frost, the strongminded, arrogant editor of the Santa Fe N ewMexican. By far the most
powerful newspaper in the Territory, the New Mexican was
also the official spokesman for the local Republican party and
for the so-called "Santa Fe Ring." At that time the paper was
partly owned by ex-Senator Stephen W. Dorsey, of "Star
Route" Mail frauds notoriety. Dorsey was now engaged in
open-range ranching and was a business associate of the
Maxwell Land, Grant Company, so that the New Mexican
naturally defended both these interests. Frost was also a
politician of no mean ability. He had 'served as United States
Land Register, Adjutant General of the Territorial Militia,
member of the Board of Immigration, and as secretary to the
New Mexico Territorial Cattleman's Association. A good
arranger and campaign manager, he was secretary of the
Republican Central Committee for a quarter of a century. a
To GovernorRoss and the reform element in the Cleveland
administration, Frost and the New Mexican were symbols of
nearly every evil they hoped to erase from New Mexico. Frost,
in turn, saw Ross as such a threat that he seized upon Ross'
reputation as a stubborn, cranky reformer, and so implanted
this' caricature in the minds of his readers; that it persisted
5. Denver Opinion, July 18, 1885; The Star and Kansan, January 16, 1885. Clippings in the Ross Papers.
6. Ralph E. Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History (Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
1912). II, 497.498; also the Las Vegas Chronicle, Oct. 25, 1886.
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throughout the Governor's lifetime and has been perpetuated
by such New Mexico historians as Twitchell and Prince.
If one might cite an example of the caricature: perhaps
Frost's most brilliant reportorial stroke was his interpretation of Ross' inauguration. When the new governor and his
family came to Santa Fe on the evening of May 26, 1885, he
announced to his predecessor, Lionel A. Sheldon, that he
wished to avoid the parties and fanfare which usually surrounded the inaugural ceremony. While this plan fitted with
Ross' own natural modesty, it also allowed his wife-a firm
temperance advocate-to escape the embarrassment of holding a teetotaling reception in convivial Santa Fe. Various
members of Ross' party suggested that since he was being
hailed as a reformer, he should take office at dawn, for itwas a
New Mexican Indian legend that some day Montezuma would
return at that hour to deliver them from bondage. Governor
Sheldon acquiesced; and on June 15, just as the sun broke
over the blue Sangre de Cristo range, the simple oath-taking
ceremony occurred at the Palace. Mrs. Sheldon thought this
was all very clever, and in a gay,mood broke out a new hat
for the occasion. 7 Somehow the news of the ceremony reached
nearby Fort Marcy, where the officers fired off an early morning salute to honor Ross. The thunder of cannon sent the
sleeping inhabitants tumbling out of doors to see what could
be the matter.
Frost, in reporting this event, christened the Governor
"Montezuma" Ross; and from that day on the nickname "Old
Monte" stuck. In subsequent months he was to picture Ross
as a pompous avenging angel bringing the unneeded torch of
reform to New Mexico. And on each occasion, he humorously
and brilliantly twisted Ross' identification with Montezuma
into a symbol of "rule or ruin" aggression.'8
A second image soon to be portrayed by Frost and the New
Mexican and many other papers as well, was that of Ross as
a Kansas "interloper," a sort of latter-day John Brown who
could not possibly understand the internal needs and unique
7. L. Bradford Prince, A Concise History of New Mexico (Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
191&), pp. 205-206; 'Twitchell, p. 496 fl'. ; Leis, "Memoirs of Ross,"
8. Santa Fe New Mexican, June 15, 1885.
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Spanish-American character of New Mexico. Thus Ross was
cast in the perennially unpopular role of "non-resident federal appointee" of the genus "carpetbagger."9 The effect of
this image is seen when some two years later the citizens of a
section of Grant County, furious with Ross for refusing to
create a new county for them, burned him in effigy and denounced "Monte Ross and his rascally set of Kansas plunderers." Towards the end of his term The Black Range cried that
the Territory had had enough of "Jay Hawker Ross" and
carpetbagger Democrats.l°
However, Ross did not spring from the gloom of retir~
ment in Kansas to the limelight of political prominence by.
way of an overnight trip on the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa
Fe. He had actually come to New Mexico in 1882, some three
years before he became governor. l l His decision to move was
undoubtedly prompted by his having suffered a decisive defeat
as a candidate for the governorship of Kansas in 1880.
He deliberately chose to settle in the booming town of
Albuquerque, for with the completion of the Santa Fe line
to that point, it had become an important business, freighting,
and outfitting center for the mining camps in the Cerrillos
and Black Range districts as well as for the Army posts and
Indian reservations to the south and west. Although Ross
ostensibly came to Albuquerque as a newspaper man, working
for the Albuquerque Morning Journal, he had seen enough of
the Kansas frontier to know that here was a chance to make
a modest fortune by "growing up" with a still newer West.'
Full of hope for the future, he wrote his wife in February,
1883, that he was in on a big mining venture which looked so
good that he had quit the newspaper and was busily studying
Spanish deeds and grants to the property.12
Nor did Ross pick Albuquerque out of thin air. He was in
correspondence with his brother-in-law,H.C. Bennett, who
had settled in Silver City and undoubtedly praised the mining
future of the region. 13 Two of Ross' former Kansas friends
9. Ibid., June 1 to September 1, 1886; January 1 to March 30, 1887. passim.
10. Deming Headlight, March 4, 1887; The Black Range, January 28, 1889.
11. Twitchell, II, 496-497n.
12. E. G. Ross to Fanny Lathrop Ross, Albuquerque, February 6, 1883. Ross Papers.
13. Leis, "Memoirs of Ross"; National ClIclopaedia of Biography, XXV, 65-66.
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had settled in Albuquerque. Elias Sleeper Stover, and ex-lieutenant governor of Kansas, had moved to Albuquerque some
years before and had founded the large wholesale grocery
concern, Stover, Crary, and Company.14 A former FreeSoiler, and a Civil War veteran of fifty-one engagements,
Stover was destined by nature and background to become
Ross' friend. It is not surprising to find that the two men soon
were closely allied in ambitious projects to advance their own
and Albuquerque's future. Having arrived in the "Duke City"
before the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, Stover, in association with Franz HUlling and William C. Hazeldine, had
bought up the land between the Barelas Road and the proposed depot and laid out the "new town." In this way they
capitalized quite handsomely on the coining of the railroad.
Stover was also one of the founders of the First National
Bank of Albuquerque. As a man with money to invest, he was
naturally interested in proj ects to build local spur lines and
in mining ventures. Upon Ross'-arrival he invited him to
participate in several of his schemes. 15
Ross' other Kansas acquaintance was W. S. Burke, editor
of the Albuquerque Morning Journal. A Civil War veteran,
he had worked on papers in Iowa and Kansas before coming
to Albuquerque in 188l,l6 Although the Journal was Republican in tone, Burke asked Ross to join his staff and the latter
appears to have done much editorial writing for it. Soon, he
and Burke were as much of a team as Ross and Stover were.
When the Albuquerque, Copper City, and Colorado Railroad
Company was organized in 1883, Burke and Ross appeared as
two of the directors. 17
Ross was of immediate use to the business and railroad
men of Albuquerque both as a publicist of ability and as a
former United States Senator. In the latter capacity he had
14. Bernice Ann Rebord, A Social History of Albuquerque, 1880-1885. Unpublished
Master's Thesis (Department of History, University of New Mexico, 1947), po.1!.
15. Victor Westphall, History of Albuquerque, 1870-1880. Unpublished Master's
Thesis (Department of History, University of New Mexico, 1947), p. 87; also papers
and documents entitled "Railroads" in the Ross Papers; Twitchell, V, 265.
16. Archie M. McDowell, The Opposition to Statehood Within the Territory of New
Mexico, 1888-1903. Unpublished Master's Thesis (Department of History, University of
New Mexico, 1939), p. 27.
17. Rebord, Social History of Albuquerque, pp. i-vi.
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access to key men in Washington and could come and go on
the floor of the Senate. Nearly a year before the Democrats
came into power, Ross went to Washington where he pressed
for a grant of land for the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad
(which line had now been absorbed by the Santa Fe). At the
same time, he and various other Albuquerque business men
had planned to build a veritable spiderweb of narrow gauge
railroads to connect Albuquerque with the new mining
camps.18 The Morning Journal began to praise the narrow
gauge scheme, and Ross himself was listed as the vice president and financial agent of the narrow gauge companies. At
one time the companies had no less than five railroads under
consideration,19
It would be misleading to attribute too many Beardian
economic impulses to Ross and his associates. While they were
determined to help forge New Mexico's railroad future, they
were equally determined to change New Mexico's cultural
history. Burke, Stover, and Ross were concerned that after
nearly forty years of American rule the Territory stiil had
no public school system. They were appalled that much of
the population still spoke only Spanish. Burke lamented that
not one in ten justices of the peace had a territorial code of
laws in his office, or that if he did, he did not know how to
read them. 20 Revealing their abolitionist backgrounds they
saw the public school and education as the essential instrument necessary to "Americanize" and "democratize" New
Mexico;21
Some two years before he became governor, Ross in cooperation with Burke, wrote a bill "for the establishment of
a public school system in the Territories," which they sent to
Senator George F. Edmunds. At the time Edmunds was busily pushing anti-Mormon legislation through Congress. Hoping to enlist his interest in New Mexico's plight, Burke sug18. W. S. Burke to Ross, January 3, 1884; also MS letter Burke? to Ross 1, January
1, 1884 in "Letters Received, 1884" in Ross Papers.
19. Albuquerque Morning Journal, August (n.d.), 1888; clipping in Ross Papers.
See also pampblet The New Mexico System of Narrow Gauge Railroads (N.Y., 1883) in
Ross Papers. Rebord, Social History of Albuquerque, P. 13.
20. Albuquerque Morning Journal, July 23, 1888.
21. W. S. Burke to Ross, January 8, 1884. Ross Papers.
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gested that the Catholic Church played the same role in resisting American social and political institutions in New Mexico
that the Mormon Church did in Utah. "We can never have
public schools in the world, in this priest-ridden Territory,
unless Congress takes the matter in hand, and now while the
fight against Mormonism is going on is the very time to move
in the matter."22 In a covering letter to Edmunds he declared
with real abolitionist fervor:
The enemy to progress and civilization that we have to fight
in New Mexico, is not polygamy, but Romanism-and between
this and the Utah blight there is but little room to choose. You
are, of course, aware of the miserable educational system-.:.ar
more properly, absence of aU system-which is maintained in
this Territory. We are absolutely without any system of public
education whatever in the sense in which the term is used in
the United States. 23

Burke's solution was to take education "out of the hands
of the legislature and county officers altogether" and to permit
only the federal officers to run the system.' Their duties included, incidentally, the power to levy school taxes.
Burke's bill and others like it were introduced but were
never passed. It is useful however, as a mirror of Ross' and
Burke's attitude towards New Mexico, and it suggests that
just as the Radicals had tried to reconstruct the post-Civil
War South, they were willing to use federal law to "reconstruct" New Mexico. When his bill died in Committee, Burke·
continued the educational struggle by becoming the first
Superintendent of Public Instruction of Bernalillo County.24
Some years later, Ross' other Kansas friend, Elias Stover, was
to become the first President of the University of New
Mexico. 25
The goals of the newcomers to Albuquerque did not stop
with matters of economic and cultural progress. Surrounding
22. W. S. Burke to George F. Edmunds, December 21, 1883. Ross Papers.
23. Ibid.
Burke was aided in his fight for local schools by Ross' having persuaded Congress
to donate certain public lands remaining in the Albuquerque town grant for educational
purposes. See MS "Land Grant for Town of Albuquerque" in Ross Papers.
Twitchell, V, 177.

24.

25.
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Ross were intelligent and ambitious young lawyers and merchants of both parties who were chafing under the rule of that
peculiar organization called the Santa Fe Ring. WhetherRepublican or Democrat they discovered that no economic or
political move could be accomplished without first consulting
the powers at Santa Fe. The young Albuquerqueans, in alliance with leaders from southern and eastern portions of the
territory, had begun to rebel as early as 1882. In 1884 they
had sent contesting members to the Assembly of 1884, and
had tried unsuccessfully to get the capitol removed from the
City of the Holy Faith to Albuquerque. 26 Embittered by the
questionable tactics which the Santa Feans used to retain
the seat of government, the fight broadened into a war between ring and anti-ring Republicans. The former were ably
represented by Max Frost, William Breeden, L. Bradford
Prince, and Thomas B. Catron, while the insurgents were
led by a brace of colorful colonels: J. Francisco Chavez and
William F. Rynerson. 27 The battle continued into the fall when
the Santa Feans nominated Prince as their candidate for
delegate while the anti-ring forces chose Rynerson to run on
an independent ticket. 28
Both Burke and Ross were delighted at the turn of political events. To one it offered the chance of a reformed Republican party, and to the other a chance for the Democrats to
win the delegateship in a three man race.-The Morning Journal, for whom it must be remembered Ross worked, began
to roast the Santa Fe ring at every opportunity. And since
frontier editors habitually most enjoyed attacking other frontier editors, Burke and Ross never failed to attack Max Frost
as the chief villain of that organization. In the spring of
i884, the Journal reported every rebellious act of the ChavezRynerson forces with the thoroughness of a New York Times
but the partisanship of the Daily Worker. The tone of the
articles is amply illustrated by a typical aside in a report of a
meeting of the Republican Territorial Convention:
26. IbicL., II, 493-494; also G. P. Hammond and T. C. Donnel.\y. The Story of New
Mexica: Its History and Government (Albuquerque, 1936), p. 135.
27. TwitchelI, n, 493.
28. For an excelIent summary of the Republican split in 1884, see The Sante Fe
Weekly New Mexican, September 1, 1884. (Bancroft).
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The most intense feeling of hatred against Max Frost has
come to light. It does not seem to be from anyone section, but
is joined in by both North and South counties. 29

Seeing a chance to bring about new political alignments,
Ross threw himself into the Democratic delegate and national
campaign of 1884 with real vigor. He supported the local
Democracy's choice for delegate: the smiling, urbane Taos
merchant and land owner, Antonio Joseph. He was also glad
to see Colonel J.F. Chavez throw his support to Joseph at
the last moment when it became apparent that Rynerson could
not win. so
The better Ross came to know his own party members in
New Mexico, however, the more disturbed he became. The
chairman of the Democratic Party's central committee in
the Territory, C. H. Gildersleeve, had bought that position
for mercenary reasons, was a speculator in land grants, and
was closely tied to the Santa Fe ring by friendship and business connections. It was apparent that he would never declare
for reform. Then Ross discovered that Antonio Joseph had
crossed party lines on local issues so often that he was actually'
a political chameleon. Some years later Ross confided his
feelings to a remarkably frank manuscript in which he called
Gildersleeve "the main Democratic manipulator for the Santa
Fe Ring and' the most unscrupulous of all that combination."
Joseph was described in this document as "Gildersleeve's
henchman" who' had actually been elected to Congress by a
split in the Republican party "engineered" by the Ring.S!
In Ross' eyes other Democratic leaders of superior talents
also revealed a distressing ambivalence when it came to party
loyalty. The extremely capable Judge Henry L. Waldo called
himself a Democrat but was actually a member of the original
Santa Fe ring and a law partner of the chairman of the territorial Republican Party.S2 Another Democrat whose ability
Ross wanted to use was William T. Thornton. But the embar29. Albuquerque Morning Journal, May 4, 1884.
SO. "The Gildersleeve, Springer, Joseph Combination." Undated manuscript in the
Ross Papers. See also Napoleon B. Laughlin to Ross, April (n.d.) 1886.
31. "The Gildersleeve, Springer, Joseph Combination"; McDowell, The Opposition
to Statehood, p. 4.
32. "The Gildersleeve, Springer, Joseph Combination."
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rassing difficulty here was that Thornton was actually a law
partner of Thomas Benton Catron, whom many thought was
-with Stephen B. Elkins-the brains behind the Santa Fe
Ring. Here Ross had discovered, incidentally, why the SantaFe Ring was so successful and yet such an enigma: it consisted of the leaders of both parties, and of many rings within
the larger one. To use Ross' own words, each combination
had, for example, a Republican and a Democratic lawyer
within its ranks "for prudential reasons so that whichever
side might come uppermost, the dominant party was
represented." 33
All the evils that had presumably been thrown out of the
front door could march back through the rear entrance if
Ross and the reform Democrats both in New Mexico and
Washington were not careful. Determined to check Gildersleeve wherever he could, Ross became a candidate for the
governorship upon the news of Cleveland's election. He was
no reluctant Cincinnatus dragged from rural Kansas, but
an active lobbyist in his own cause. He wrote Cleveland asking for the position of governor, got Burke as a Republican
editor to endorse his appointment, and persuaded Albuquerque friends to protest the possible appointment of L. S. Trimble to the position. His friend, S. M. Ashenfelter, kept up an
editorial crusade to get rid of Gildersleeve and all rings. Ross
himself went to Washington where he found Joseph and
Gildersleeve lobbying for other candidates. Much to the surprise of the New Mexican press, and probably to the great
surprise and disappointment of Gildersleeve, Ross had soon
edged out the other candidates. 34 He received the appointment in May, 1885.
To secure office then, Ross had to fight both the regular
Republican and Democratic machines-if the informal, logrolling factions that went under those names in New Mexico
33. Ross to John O'Grady (copy), March 26, 1887; William A. Keleher, The Fabulous Frontier (Santa Fe, 1945), p. 104n.
34. Ross to Grover Cleveland (COpy) Washington, April 30, 1885; W. S. Burke to
Grover Cleveland, May 20, 1885; manuscript UPetition" of Albuquerque citizens, 1885.
Ross Papers.
'
Southwest Sentinel, March 7 and 21, 1885.
The Las Vegas Daily Optic, April 24, 1885, thought that William T. Thornton had
the best chance of becoming governor and that Ross was only third in line.
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can be called that; His correspondence reveals particularly
the complexity and bitterness of the intra-party fight. Early
in March, 1885, W. B. Childers, an Albuquerque lawyer,
warned him that Thornton, while appearing friendly to Ross'
cause, was actually seeking the governorship for himself. 35
Three weeks later, George W. Fox wrote from Socorro that
Delegate Joseph was "against" him. 36 A year later, while
still awaiting Senate confirmation, Ross learned through Senator Manderson of Kansas that his own party chairman, Gildersleeve, had preferred some ten charges against Ross in a
secret letter to the Senate Committee on Territories. Among
the charges was the accusation that Ross, by pretending to
be "Montezuma" on inauguration day, had mocked the religion of the local Indians and had so shocked their sensibilities
that it had made Indian-white relations 'in New Mexico immeasurably more difficult. 37
What a contrast is this intricate struggle to the Denver
newspaper's halcyon description of Ross as an obscure old
man who first learned that he was Governor while working
in the typesetting room, where, as the news of his appointment spread, an amazed family and a disbelieving set of
friends gathered about him to offer congratulations. 3s

*

*

*

*

After such complicated preliminaries, it still remains to
be seen what sort of administration Governor Ross conducted.
Ralph E. Twitchell, no friend of the Kansan, termed it a fiasco. Under Ross, he wrote, "Cleveland's officials organized an
assault upon the titles of lands in New Mexico ... [which
for] .virulence of action and incapacity of management has
never found a parallel in the history of the United States."aD
L. Bradford Prince, Ross' successor in office wrote: "Absolutely honest and well meaning but proud of his firmness, he
[Ross] antagonized his own party as well as the Republican
35. W. B. Childers to Ross, March 3, 1385. Ross Papers.
36. George W. Fox to Ross, March 21, 18S5. Ross Papers.
37. Senators M. C. Butler and Charles F. Manderson to Ross (n.d.) in "Letters
Received, March to April, 1886," Ross Papers. See also Edward L. Bartlett to Ross, April
20, 1886; and Napoleon B. Laughlin to Ross, April (n.d.) 1886.
38. Denver Opinicm, July 18, 1885.
39. Twitchell, II, p. 498.

189

GOVERNOR ROSS

legislature, and was soon powerless to accomplish anything."
Ross' administration, he concluded, was "quite barren of
result."40 Charles Coan and Helen Haines, each with a one
sentence reference to Ross, and Maurice Fulton and Paul
Horgan by their complete silence in New Mexico's Own
Chronicle, would seem to concur. 41
Besides the difficulties with his local party Ross was hampered at the outset by an uncongenial set of federal officers
with whom to work. While Secretary Lane and Attorney General Smith cooperated with Ross, and the venerable Surveyor
General, George W. Julian, became Ross' most trusted political friend, they were only the "reform" appointees. 24 Political
realities demanded that Congressman William M. Springer,
chairman of the House Committee on Territories, Delegate
Joseph, and Gildersleeve control most of the patronage. The
new chief justice, William A. Vincent, consequently proved
to be a friend of Congressman Springer and ex-Senator Dorsey, and eventually a willing advocate of the Santa Fe Ring. 43
The new United States marshal, Romulo Martinez, was so
deeply involved in a fight over the legal ownership of the
Canon del Agua Grant that his worth seemed questionable to
Ross.44 While Ross did work with Judge Elisha V. Long and
Judge Henderson, he distrusted Reuben A. Reeves. 45 It was
in Reeves' court that many of Ross' executive acts were decIa-red invaIid. 46
Although the Delegate Antonio Joseph was not technically
a federal official in the sense that the judges and Ross were,
much of Ross' program depended upon Congressional legis40. Prince, C<mcise History, PP. 205-206.
41. Charles F. Coan. A History of New Mexico (Chicago, 1925), p. 407.
Helen Haines. History of New Mexico (N.Y.• 1891). p. 254.
Maurice G. Fulton and Paul Horgan, New Mexico's Own. Chronicle (Dallas, 1937).
42. Leis, "Memoirs of Ross."
43. Ross had not been in office a full three months when it was disclosed that
Vincent had so compromised himself in rulings on land cases involving his friend
Senator Dorsey that Cleveland removed him. Instead of leaving the territory. however,
Vincent stayed on to become a lawyer for the very interests Ross was fighting.
"The' Gildersleeve, Springer, Joseph Combination": see also Arie W. Poldervaa~J
Black-Robed J1UJtice (Santa Fe,
p.
44. !IThe Gildersleeve, Springer, Joseph Combination."
Ross to Van H. Manning, Santa Fe, January
describes the subtle
pressures of land-grant interests on the federal judges. Ross papers.
Rio Grande Republican., January
(Bancroft).

1948),

45.
46.

135.

15, 1886,

22, 1887.
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lation and support from Washington. While he and Joseph
maintained the most cordial public relations, and their correspondence was Chesterfieldian in its politeness and urbanity, Joseph either by disinterest or subtle opposition often
defeated ~ome of Ross' most treasured goals. Ross himself
appeared frequently in Washington during his term of office
to lobby for certain causes in ~hich Joseph had no interest.
Isolated from much of his own party and many of the
local officials, it was but natural that Ross should· turn to a
man with views about New Mexico that were almost identical.
to his own. This was Surveyor General George W. Julian.
Like the governor, Julian had a national reputation as a fearless and incorruptible man, and as a public lands expert as
well. 47 Cleveland had appointed the Hoosier statesman in the
hope that he could solve the labyrinthine tangle that enmeshed the Spanish and Mexican land grants in New Mexico.
Constantly encouraged by letters and notes from Secretary
of the Interior Lamar and Land Commissioner Sparks to continue the good work of "reformation and restoration," the
two men struggled to settle the land grants once and for all. 48
Unfortunately Julian took the view that truly Draconian
measures must be employed. After casting doubt on all the
decisions of his predecessors in the Surveyor General's office,
he announced that ninety per cent of all the land entries in
the territory were fraudulent. 49 While this statistic was probably correct, it also struck at every citizen of means in New
Mexico and at the livelihood of the entire legal profession
there. Much of the intense bitterness over Ross' administration was actually caused by Julian's ruthless scrutiny of land
records and his scathing reports to Washington. Julian's findings led to the arrest of former Land Register Max Frost on .
charges of fraudulent land entry and his conviction in a trial
47. "George W. Julian," in the Dictionary of American Biography, X, 245-246.
48. L.Q.C. Lamar to R~ss, September 23, 1885; A. J. Sparks to Ross, November 7,
1887. In acknowledging Ross' Annual Report, Sparks wrote "In the name of the homeseekers I thank you. Let the good work go on. The Land "grabbing" rascals will die
hard, but as sure as God is just we'll beat them." Ross Papers.
49. See a review and comments on Julian's assertion in the Deming Headlight, September 19, 1886. Ross upheld Julian's "90%" figure in his 1887 message to the Assembly.
For comments on his stand, see the Rio Grande Republican, January I, 1887.
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before Judge Long. 50 Julian also summarized his investigations in a blunt article for the North American Review in
which he fiercely denounced ex-Senator Dorsey, and called
Gildersleeve a politician "for revenue only."51 The hornet's
nest had been stirred; and the effects soon began to appear.
Senator Preston B. Plumb of Kansas warned Ross that letters
were pouring into Washington complaining that Julian's
methods had brought all business in New Mexico to a standstill, since no one was sure of title to property.52 In a slap at
Julian and the Cleveland administration, the 1886 Democratic Territorial Convention unanimously adopted a resolution to play down land frauds, and Delegate Joseph successfully ran for re-election on such a ticket.53 Julian was accurate
in his charges, and undoubtedly had the future good of New
Mexico at heart, but his public diatribes only increased the
difficulties underwhich Ross labored.
While being so closely identified with Julian, Ross also
attracted criticism by appointing members of his family to
office. One of his sons functioned as his personal secretary
while another worked for Julian. His son-in-law, Thomas P.
Gable, became warden, while he chose his nephew by marriage, S. M. Ashenfelter, as district' attorney for the third
district court. Later he replaced Gable with still another
relative, H.C. Bennett, his brother-in-law.
Within his own executive branch Ross faced a complicated
problem: somehow, he had to oust Republican appointees
from important territorial (as opposed to federal) offices
such as those of treasurer, attorney general and district attorney before he could put a Democratic administration into
gear. A territorial court ruling of 1880, however, declared
that the incumbents of territorial office could hold their positions for two years from time of appointment, or until the
50. Twitchell, II, 498n.
51. George W. Julian, uLand Stealing in New Mexico," North American Review
(July 1, 1887). pp. 27-30. See also Harold H. Dunham, Government Handout: A Study
in the Administration of the Public Lande (New York, 1941), p. 180 fl'.
52. Preston B. Plumb to Ross, July 9, 1886. Ross Papers.
A typical New Mexican reacton to Julian's charges may be found in the Rio Grande
Republican, July 16, 1887.
53. Julian, "Land Stealing in New Mexico," pp. 28-29.
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biennial legislature should again meet and confirm their successors. Governor Sheldon had shrewdly reappointed all these
officials just before leaving office, and since the legislature did
not meet again until the winter of 1886-87 it meant that Ross
would normally have to wait over a year to replace these men.
Like the man he had refused to impeach in 1868, Ross himself
was now faced with a local "tenure of office act" which had
been designed to curb the governor's power. By dint of persuasion Ross secured two resignations, but his chief stumbling blocks were Colonel William Breeden, the territorial
attorney general, and Antonio Ortiz y Salazar, the territorial
treasurer. Breeden was also the chairman of the Republican
party and further, under Governor Sheldon's lax hand, had
become virtually the acting governor of New Mexico. 54 Selfconfident, opinionated, a good fighter and a good hater, he
obstructed Ross' every move during the latter's first year in
office.
Sorely troubled by the continued presence of these Republican officers, Ross badgered the United States Attorney General A. H. Garland for legal opinions as to how he could remove them. 55
It is very important to the success of my administration
that I should remove these officials, if I have the power, and
not remain responsible for their continuance in office....
The conditions here are peculiar, and of such a character
that I cannot afford to make a mistake by allowing" myself to
be hurried beyond my judgment. To attempt these removals and
be beaten in the Courts, although the intelligent Republican
sentiment might be with me, would be an almost fatal mistake,
while a successful attempt at removal would at once create a
complete political revolution, so prone is the great mass of the
people here, the native element, to go with the winning party in
a controversy.

Washington was of little help in this matter, so Ross finally decided that he must act regardless of the consequences.
After waiting some six months he asked the resignation of
54. Ross to Attorney General A. H. Garland, Santa Fe, August 24, 1885; see also
Ross to Van H. Manning, Santa Fe, January 15, 1886. Ross Papers.
55. Ross to Garland, August 24, 1885.
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E. C. Wade as district attorney of the third judicial district.
Wade refused to resign and Judge Reeves upheld Wade's contention. 56 Defeated in the courts, Ross tried another tack with
Colonel Breeden. By November, 1885, he felt that he had
enough evidence of misconduct in office to suspend Breeden.
Using the trusted medium of the press, he. fired that obstreperous official in a broadside proclamation the language of
which electrified the territory: 57
As to the "cause" for your suspension ... you were suspended for drunkenness, licentiousness, gambling, and misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance in office; crimes which
ought not be tolerated in a public official.

In replacing Breeden Ross attempted to make peace with
some of the factions in his own party. He approached his former competitor for the governorship, W. T. Thornton, with
the proposal that if Thornton would end his law partnership
with T..R Catron, Ross would make him attorney general.
Thornton refused to accept the conditions, and Ross appointed
Napoleon B. Laughlin in his stead. 58At the same time Ross
supported another competitor for the governorship, Romulo
Martinez, for the marshalship.59 These efforts at cooperation
with the other wings of the Democratic party appeared to
have had little practical effect, however.
Ross waited until July, 1886, to remove Ortiz y Salazar,
the territorial treasurer. Again he used the method of public
proclamation. Charging Ortiz y Salazar with having speculated in territorial warrants and with mismanagement of
funds designed for building the territorial penitentiary, he
removed him and appointed Bernard Seligman in his place. 60
Knowing that the legislature might not confirm his new
choices, Ross tried to get Congress to pass a bill reapportion56. Ross to E. C. Wade, October 22, 1885.
67. Ross to William Breeden, Santa Fe, November 13, 1885; see also. printed
"Broadside" published November 24, 1885. Ross Papers.
68. Ross to Van H. Manning, Santa Fe, January 15, 1886. Ross Papers.
59. Ross to Senator John J. Ingalls, June 3, 1886, in which Ross urged that Judges
Long and Henderson, and Attorney General Smith be continued in office.
60. See Public Letter of Ross to Ortiz y Salazar, July 28, 1886. Ross Papers. The
Las Vegas Chronicle, August 18, 1886, contains an account of the Ross-Salazar fight.
(Bancroft) .
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ing the gerrymandered legislative New Mexican districts so
that a more amenable body might be elected to the 1886-87
session. 61 With opposition from Gildersleeve at home and with
luke-warm support from Joseph, this plan failed. Having
tangled with the courts, Ross' "interference" with the legislative branch naturally embittered his relations with the
members of the 27th Assembly. They convened in 1887 ready
with mailed fist to do battle with the Kansas interloper. Although the Republicans had only a slight majority in either
House, they were so tightly and brilliantly controlled by a
caucus system set up and run by Colonel Chavez that Ross
could never break the phalanx. 62 And to hamper Ross still
further, in the fall of 1886 the lawyers of New Mexico had
formed a Bar Association with none other than ex-Judge
William Vincent as its president. Whenever the legislature
considered bill, it went to the Bar AssoCiation for approval
first; and if it did not approve, the bill went no further. 63 This
was even more the case in 1889 when the Bar virtually wrote
and introduced every act passed.
The complicated infighting which characterized Ross' relations with the 27th legislature need not be detailed here.
Suffice it to say that he vetoed some twenty-five percent of
the bills passed by the Assembly, and it, in retaliation, embarrassed him at every turn. Ross, for example, was soon at
loggerheads with the solons over his direction of the new penitentiary.64 In seeking someone he. could trust, Ross quite unwisely appointed his son-in-law, Thomas P. Gable as Warden.
The newspapers quickly filled with innuendoes about the

a

61. Antonio Joseph to Ross, May 31, 1886; Shelby M. Cuilom to Ross, June 3, 1886;
Benjamin Harrison to Ross, June 7, 1886. In his letter Harrison indicated that he disapproved of the reappointment scheme as federal interference with local government.
Ross Papers.
. 62. Ross to L. Q. C. Lamar, January 26, 1887.
Joseph had warned Ross in 1886 that he must get Frank Manzanares to persuade
Don Candelario Garcia to vote Democratic in order to control the Council. Garcia, who
posed as an uindependent" in a council divided into six Republicans' and five Democrats,
finaily found the opposition more attractive. Joseph to Ross, Ojo Caliente, November
24, 1886.
A good analysis of the makeup of the 27th Assembly may be found in the Deming
Headlight, January 2, 1887.
63. Prince, Concise HistoT1J, p. 206.
64. See references to the penitentiary fight in the Santa Fe New Mexican, February
1 to March 30, passim; see also "Letters Received, January-February-March, 1887" in
Ross Papers.
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"Gable-Ross syndicate," nepotism, and the like. The pettiness
of the conflict is revealed by Gildersleeve's writing a letter to
the Secretary of the Interior accusing Ross of stealing stone
from the penitentiary for his own use. 66 And as Ross had
feared, the Assembly declined to confirm Seligman as treasurer, to seat Henry L~ Warren as attorney general (N. B.
Laughlin had declined the appointment) or to accept two new
appointees for positions of district attorney.67 Finally, the
Assembly defeated a good public school bill which had been
backed by Ross.68
.
Despite the actual defeat of every item of his program,
Ross' fighting spirit was never stronger. It was now that he
"rejoiced in opposition," to use Prince's phrase. In a letter to
John O'Grady, a newspaper friend in St. Louis, he admitted
that the legislature might make him seem such a terrible
executive that Cleveland would ask for his resignation. If
that happened, he predicted they would then move against
Julian and Attorney General Smith. He also confessed that
his enemies had large newspaper backing. But he was optimistic about the long-range effects :69
This crusade is tending to a reorganization of party lines
here. All fair-minded, law abiding people, Republicans as well
as Democrats, are disgusted with the composition and course
of the majority in the late Legislature....

In the same letter Ross drew an ironic parallel between
his fight with the New Mexican Assembly and that of himself
and Johnson with a Radical Congress. Then he threw down
the gauntlet:
I defy them now as on the other occasion cited, to do their
worst: This is 1887, not 1868.... This has become a fight to the
65. Pamphlet: The Other Side-Warden Gable's Reply (Las Vegas, 1887), in Ross
Papers. See also Rio Grande Republican, March 5, 1887.
Ross made the further mi;take of' appointing his brother in law, H. C. Bennett, to
replace Gable. See criticism of the appointment in the Deming Headlight, October'
28, 1887.
66. Gildersleeve to the Secretary of the Interior (COpy), February 26, 1886. Ross
Papers.
67. Ross to L. Q. C. Lamar, January 26, 1887. in Ross "Letterbook," Ross Papers.
68. Ross to John O'Grady, March 26, 1887.
69. Ibid.
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death, it will go on till I am killed or out of office. or the thieves
in prison.

*

*

*

Before the next Assembly was to meet, Ross became involved in less dramatic but extremely important disputes
over the economic destiny of New Mexico. Here again he was
forced into the role of a fighting minority,· even within his
own party ranks. True to his Kansas free-soil convictions
and philosophy, Ross dreamed of a New Mexico populated
by homesteading family farmers who boasted an American
background. He constructed an attractive catechism of New
Mexican development which he pursued by speech and deed
for the rest of his life. It ran as follows: settle the Spanish and
Mexican land grant tangle by a special federal commission or
court. Once title is cleared, reserve these public lands for
homesteaders rather than ranchers, the small farm to be
made feasible by government irrigation projects which would
supply water at cost to the settler. 70 Simultaneously; mining
should be encouraged both by the importation of capital arid
the building of railroads. The farmer would therefore have a
ready made local market in the mining communities, while
the mining companies and the railroads would furnish the
economic means to bring schools, proper political organiza.tions, civilization, and statehood. In every annual report, in
every speech, he recited this plan. And while Ross may not be
counted as one of New Mexico's most popular or successful
governors, he .hadnevertheless such a thorough and significant free soil theory of colonial maturation, that had he been
successful he would have been indeed a "Montezuma" for
New Mexico.
In what ways did he attempt to make his program or
"credo" a reality? In his annual reports to the Secretary of
the Interior Ross at first urged the creation of -a Federal Commission (this was the era of the Utah, Civil Service, and
Interstate Commerce Commissions) to settle land problems.
He persuaded Joseph to introduce a bill to Congress to that
70. Report of the ·G01JeTnor of New Mezico to the Secretary of the Interior, 1886
(Washington, 1886), p. 8.
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effect.n He also asked prominent New Mexicans to go to
Washington to lobby in its behalf. 72 Ross encountered both
the opposition of Julian and United States Land Commissioner Sparks, however, so that a year later he declared instead for the creation of a court of private land claims. 73 He
journeyed to Washington to testify in favor of its creation.
Upon ·discovering that the proposed court was to sit exclusively in the national capital, he conducted a campaign to
amend the act so that the court must convenein the territories
affected. Only in this way, Ross thought, could the small
claimant bear the expenses of a trial. When the McCreary
Act embodying these proposals became law in July, 1888,
Delegate Joseph graciously congratulated Ross on having
played a major role in its formulation and passage. 74 Since
Governor Prince somewhat immodestly takes full credit for
having gotten this court, and Ralph Twitchell gives Frank
Springer the credit for its creation, it seems only fair-given
the actual history of the origins of this court-to let Ross
share some of the laurels toO. 75
An incidental obstacle to the achievement of Ross' New
Mexican "utopia" was the Indian problem. When renegade
Apaches led by Geronimo and other chiefs went on the warpath in the fall of 1885, the settlers and miners of southwestern New Mexico and portions of Arizona besieged Ross with
panic-stricken reports. Angered by the slow movements of
General Crook, and acutely distrustful of Crook's use of
Indian scouts, Ross in a joint letter signed by all federal New
Mexican officials asked Cleveland to remove Crook and ap71. Report of the Governor of New Mexico to the Secretary of the Interior. i885
(Washington, 1885). pp. 4-5. See also Antonio Joseph to Ross. May 31. 1886. and July
19, 1886. Ross Papers.
72. Ross' efforts to raise a delegation of influential New Mexicans to go to Washington to force settlement of land titles are revealed mostly by the replies of the men
approached. See the letters of Roman Baca, Antonio Joseph. A. J. Fountain. Thomas
Dorsey. John A. Lee, Nicolas and Nestor Armijo. W. B. Childers. H. M. Meredith. to
Ross in "Letters Received, November-December, 1887," Ross Papers.
73. Sene-te Executive Document No. 136. 49th Cong .• 1st. Sess.; see also Ross' testimony before the Committee on Private Land Claims on July 26. 1888, extracts of
which may be found in his "Political Speeches," in the Ross Papers.
Julian, "Land Stealing in New Mexico,"- PP. 29-30.
74. Telegram of Antonio Joseph to Ross, July 25. 1888; letter of Joseph to Ross,
July 30. 1888. Ross Papers.
75. Prince. Concise, History, p. 207; Twitchell. II, 462-467.
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point General Nelson A. Miles in his stead. 76 He pressed Governor Zulick of Arizona to do the same. 77 Ross was also highly
indignant that certain eastern papers were suggesting at this
time that the settlers were playing up an Indian war in order
to sell agricultural goods at premium prices to troops.78 Far
from being a sentimental humanitarian, ·Ross stood for any
Indian policy, no matter how harsh, which would allow the
settler to come in. On the Indian issue, at least, Ross and the
territory were united. It is fitting in a way that the last Indian
outbreak in New Mexican history should be ended during
Ross' "no nonsense and no pampering" administration. Nor
is it surprising to find that he supported the Dawes Severalty
Act, which in theory turned the Indian into a homesteading
farmer. 79
By advocating homestead poliCies, Ross inevitably came
into conflict with the range cattleman just when the latter
was in his heyday. Although mining provided some $6,000,000
in wealth annually for New Mexico in 1886, the product of
the cattle industry that year was estimated at $13,000,000. 80
Moreover, it was Texas cattlemen and ranchers who. comprised an important section of the territorial Democratic
party. Nevertheless, when Ross learned that the Lincoln
County Stock Association was harassing sheep men in that
district, his sympathies were immediately on the side of the
sheep men. 81 By correspondence with local democrats and
sympathetic editors Ross discreetly collected evidence ab.out
these conflicts. The more he learned the less he approved of
cattlemen in general. He found, for example, that the so-called
"quarantine laws" designed to keep diseases-and notabl~
Mexican cattle-out of the territory, actually had the practi76. Ross to Grover Cleveland, Santa Fe, November 7, 1885. Ross Papers. See also·
W. H. H. Llewellyn to General George Crook, January 30, 1886, quoted in Katherine
Shephard, The Miles-Crook Controversy. Unpublished Master'" Thesis (Department of
History, University of New Mexico,
p. 50.
77. Ross to Governor G. Meyer Zulick, Santa Fe, August 4, 1886. MS. letter in
Arizona Territorial Papers (Arizona State Archives, Phoenix).
78. Ross to Congressman James Laird, Santa Fe, December 5, 1886. Ross Papers.
79. Ibid.
80. Hammond and Donnelly, The Story of New Mexico, p. 137. The Stock Grower
(Las Vegas), February 11, 1888.
8!. - - to Ross, Fort Stanton, June 22, 1885; John Y. Hewitt to Ross, White
Oaks, New Mexico, June 23, 1885. Ross Papers.
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cal effect of reserving the range for those cattlemen who were
already in New Mexico. Many local ranchers were, in fact,
smuggling more cattle in from Mexico in order to hold larger
range plots. 82 Since the sheriff of Lincoln County was also
the vice-president of the Cattle Association there, Ross knew
that he was not a very reliable instrument of justice where
sheep men were concerned. 83 But to Ross the injustice went
further than that. To him the ranching industry implied a
sparse population, huge landed estates-which he called "a
constant menace to popular government"-and oligarchic
rule. It does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that Ross saw
in the rancher the threat to freedom that he saw in the slaveowning planter in Kansas in 1856.
Typical of Ross' difficulties in bringing about justice in
a cattle-sheep conflict was his experience in dealing with one
E. Carlisle, a rancher living on the New. Mexico-Colorado
border. In the winter of 1885-86 Ross learned that two Durango cowboys employed by Carlisle had shot and killed a
New Mexican sheep herder with the improbable name of
Ricardo Jacques. A mock trial had been held, during which
the friends of the cowboys had brought their guns into the
courtroom and had held a cocked Winchester on any witness
thought to be hostile. Ross' investigation also revealed that
Carlisle had wired Attorney General Breeden to get his men
"off." As the unpleasant facts came in the Governor concluded that not only had injustice been done, but that Carlisle's was a "hurrah" outfit which had caused trouble with
Indians in that section; and further, as Coloradoans, had
actually poached on New Mexican soil traditionally reserved
for sheep herders. 84 Nothing in Ross' whole career excited
him more than this type of evasion of law and order. In a
phillipic to Carlisle, whom he considered the real culprit he
declared that:
.
82. J. E. Curren to Ross, Lake Valley, New Mexico, July 7, 1885. Ross Papers.
83. Hewitt to Ros~, June 23, 1885. Ross Papers.
84. See letters, newspaper clippings, telegrams, and public broadsides in "CattleSheep Wars" folder, Ross Papers. See particularly a broadside letter from Ross to
Carlisle, February 9, 1886; Carlisle to Ross, Durango, February 13, 1886; Ross to J. D.
Warren, February 16, 1886; T. D. Burns to Ross, Tierra Amarills, February 17, 1886;
Ross to Carlisle, February 18, 1886; Affidavit of Telesfor Lopez, March 8, 1886.
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Your employees ... have for years constituted the nucleus
of an element that has practically terrorized that region of
country. You have permitted them to go armed, contrary to
the laws of New Mexico, and sustained ,them in their lawless
proceedings, till a -reign of public disorder seems imminent.
You have the power, through control of your employees, to put
a stop to these practices. This, I insist that you do and cause
them to respect the equal right of others, and the law. If you do
not, they shall be arrested and punished, or driven from the
Territory. 85

Ross was as good as his word for by May, 1886, the Grand
Jury of Colfax County had indicted William Wilson for murder and Lee Hamblett and Stephen Roupe as accessories, and
the men were eventually convicted. 86 In other instances, however, Ross failed to make his power felt. Evasive and laconic
explanations by local peace officers of how somebody just
happened to get shot by "persons unknown," or who had obviously let the guilty parties escape, drew from Ross thunderous
reminders that they must do their duty or else. 87 Nevertheless,
the cattle and sheep "wars" continued, and local sheriffs and
juries continued to favor the cattleman.
Ross expressed his anti-cattle bias in his first annual
report to the Interior Department by recommending that
there be no further disposal of public lands except for homesteadingpurposes. 88 In subsequent reports he commented that
the cattleman's theory of a permanent range was a bad one,
for a cattle frontier was by nature temporary.89 In a speech to,
the Aztec Club of New Mexico in July, 1885, he complimented
the cattlemen upon their contribution to the settlement and
wealth of the territory, but he warned them that there must
be order between them and the sheep interests. That order
was needed, he said, so people would migrate to New Mexico.
"People are worth more to a state than steers," he exclaimed,
... "for with people comes capital and the spirit of commercial
85. Ross to Carlisle, February 9, 1886.
86. MS Bills of Indictment for William Wilson, Lee Hamblett, and Stephen Roupe
presented by the Colfax County Grand Jury, 1886.
87. See "Proclamations in Ross Papers for one to force sheriffs ·"to make arrests."
88. Report of the Governor of New Mexico. .. , 1885, pp. 7-8.
89. Report of the Governor of New Mexico. •. , 1887, pp. 6-8.
H
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adventure, development, prosperity, and greatness."90 Two
years later he bluntly told a crowd at the Territorial Fair that
the "granger was coming and coming to stay."91
Naturally, Ross' position caused comment. J.' E. Curran,
'editor of the Sierra Grande Press wrote in the fall of 1885:
I 'love you for the enemies you have made'. The rings and
cliques don't like you. The Deming ring don't like you'. The
Hopewell and Grayson cattle ring are down on you, and the
Las Cruces gang would betray you first,chance. 92

A week later Jesse E. Thompson, the Superintendent of
Public Schools in Sierra, warned that the "Cattle barons" and
"land jobbers" were down on Ross and were allied with
Breeden and Thornton. 93
It would seem obvious that if Ross properly fit~ed the
"rule or ruin" role conferred upon him by Max Frost and
others, he would have gone after the Maxwell Land Grant
Company and Frank Springer, its able lawyer. Here was
another symbol of all Ross disliked: the seemingly fraudulent
land grant claim, the cattle empire with an anti-nester policy,
and the ec~nomic tyrant of most of northeastern New Mexico.
While Surveyor General Julian would give no quarter to these
interests, Ross steered clear of the perennial feuds and imbroglios in Colfax County as much as possible. He carefully
evaded identification with Oscar P. McMains, that indefatigable'crusader against the Maxwell interests. He allowed M. W.
Mills, a Republican and a Maxwell man, to remain district
attorney in Colfax County throughout his administration
despite strong pressure from local Democrats to appoint
Sydney Smith. While Mills was certainly a capable attorney
90. Pamphlet: GO'VeT'YWT Rass' Banquet Speech ta the Aztec Club af Albuquerque
(July 22, 1885). Copy in Henry E. Huntington Library. See also Albuquerque Marning
Jaur71al, July 23, 1885.
91. Albuquerque Marning Demacrat, September 21, 1887; Deming Hcadlight, S~
tember 23, 1887.
Roy Willoughby has asserted that open-range ranching in New Mexico was actually
on the decline by 1885. See his The Cattle Range Industry in New Mexico. Unpublished
Master's Thesis (Department of History, University·of New Mexico, 1933), p. 89.
92. J. E. Curren to Ross, Navember 29~ 1885. Ross Papers.
93. Jesse E. Thompson to Ross, December' 8, 1885. Ross Papers.
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heW-as by no means a reformer: 94 Ross even shied away from
outright support of anyone newspaper or policy for the
region. It is very probable that Ross expected the Maxwell
Company to get its just deserts in the outcome of the trial
pending against it in the Supreme Court in 1887. But the
surprise decision that the Company had a right to .its extended claims put an end to any such hope. 95 The point to be
made is that while Ross was a reformer who wanted to impose free soil ideals on New Mexico, he was not so impulsive
and uncomplicated as Max Frost might suggest in his stereotype. As Ross himself had said to Attorney General Garland,
he did not want to be "hurried" beyond his judgment.

*

*

*

*

By 1887 it was obvious that Ross was not going to "reform" New Mexico through legislation, or by way of a faithful executive set of officers. Relying upon his faith in public
opinion he had established a small administration paper, the
Santa Fe Weekly Leader; but deprived of legislative patronage, it quietly succumbed. He negotiated through prominent
Democrats to buy the Las Vegas Chronicle and later the
Optic, hut these efforts also failed. 96 While he had the support
of J. C. Albright in the Albuquerque Morning Democrat, J. E.
Curren in the Sierra Grande Press, and Singleton M. Ashenfelter, editor of the Southwest Sentinel, these were not powerful enough to turn the tide of hostile opinion. The inchoate
societies of the Southwestern. mining towns and the recently
arrived farmers whose interests Ross defended were not yet
organized in such a way that they could be a force in Ross'
favor. Clearly Montezuma's restoration was at an impasse.
How could he find his way to go ahead?
Ross' answer was similar to Johnson's program for reconstructing the South: a quick and easy pasf;\age to state94. See letter in behalf of French in "Letter Received. July. 1885"; J. C. Holmes
to Ross, Raton, July 31, 1885; and O. P. McMains to Ross. August (n.d.). 1885 urging
Mills' removal. Ross Papers.
95. Dunham. Go-vernme-nt HandO'l.<t, pp. 233-238, also the Santa Fe New Me",ican,
February 2, 1889.
96. Scattered copies of the Leader are "in the Ross Papers. See also correspondence
concerning the purchase of the Gazette and Optic in "Letters Received, March to April,
1886," Ross Papers. Delegate Joseph was pessimistic about the sUccess of a Democratic
paper in Santa Fe and refused to encourage Ross in his endeavors. Joseph to Ross, July
23, 1886.
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hood. In the spring of 1887 he persuaded the amiable Delegate
Joseph to present a memorial for New Mexico's admission
to the Union. His hopes rose further when Congress considered the Springer Omnibus Bill of December 1887, which proposed that the Dakotas, Montana and New Mexico be admitted together. Writing to his brother-in-law, H. C. Bennett
of Silver City, he urged him to support the bill. The advan...
tages of statehood were so great, he argued, that the New
Mexican public must be aroused to demand admission. 97 The
failure of the Springer bilLdid not dampen Ross' enthusiasm.
AgaIn in 1888 Joseph was persuaded to introduce a statehood
memorial, and Ross himself began to mention the outlines of
a proposed constitution in his public speeches. 98 Even after
Cleveland was defeated in November, 1888, and it was obvious
that Ross' term as governor would soon end, he declared
himself in favor of statehood in his message to the 28th
Assembly.99
'
While the political intrigues surrounding the 1889 con:stitutional convention occurred after Ross had left office, and
do not fall within the purview of this study, it is proper to
note that despite the opposition of much of his own partywho felt that the Republican legislature had unfairly apportioned the delegates to the convention-Ross appears to have
worked diligently for admission. The' constitution produced
by that convention was so conservative and "pro land grant,"
however, that in disgust he joined his party in opposing its
ratification. Ross is on record as having opposed statehood
when in actuality he opposed only the constitution propounded by the statehood forces of 1889 and 1890. 100
Ross' final year in office was crowded with frustrating difficulties. The election of a new legislature was accompanied by
evidence of such blatant frauds at the polls that Ross appealed
to Washington for legal aid to prevent the defeated candidates
97. Ross to H. C. Bennett, Washington, Fehruary 24, 1888.
98. See "COpy" 'of Joseph's Memorial, March 27, 1888, in Ross Papers.
Edmund G. Ross, General and Special Messages to the 28th Legislative Assembly
of the Territory of New Mexico (Santa Fe, 1889), p. iv; Acts of the Legislative Assembly
of . .. New Mexico, Twenty-Eighth Session (Santa Fe, 1889), Chapter 99, Pp. 235-240.
100. For an excellent post-mortem of the 1889 vote on the New Mexico Constitution,
see Ross' broadside public letter to Congressman C. H. Mansur. January 5, 1890, entitled
"The New Mexico Statehood Proposition:' Ross Papers.

99.
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from contesting the election and thus hampering the legislature. The election itself had been climaxed by the murder of
Dumas Provencher, a homesteader, who was shot at the polls
in Sari Rafael. The murder was a political one, but Ross' efforts to apprehend the killers were met by such extraordinary
evasiveness on the part of both parties that little could be
done. 101 Ashe read the conflicting reports he was faced with
a new Assembly whose Republican members seemed determined to clear those suspected of committing the crime. Undoubtedly he agreed with the pessimistic conclusion of Walter
G. Marmon, an old friend' who was now the governor, of
Laguna Pueblo, who wrote him that the "present legislature"
was no improvement on the one of two years before: "personal
likes and dislikes, partisan hate and ignorance rule the actions
of its members."102
Still undaunted, Ross sent a ringing reform message to
the 28th Assembly. He proposed abolition of the antiquated
and unsatisfactory financial system of the territory. Unfair
taxation, speculation in territorial warrants, the corrupt office of county assessor and non-taxation of land grants were
his particular targets of criticism. He mad his usual plea for
a public school system and at. the same time urged the establishment of an insane asylum. In conformity with his home:.
steading and mining program for New Mexico, he urged the
creation of an agricultural college, irrigation development,
the settlement of land titles, and a geological survey for the
Territory.103 ,
Like its predecessor, the 28th Assembly was extremely
hostile to Ross. Now that enough time had elapsed so that
Ross had the legal right to appoint new territorial officers,
the legislature refused to confirm most of his choices, full
knowing that if they did, these Democratic incumbents could
then hold office for two years-just as Colonel Breeden had
101. Amado Chavez to Ross, San Mateo, November 10 and 28, 1888; and Walter G.
Marmon to Ross, Laguna, Janua;'" 26, 1889. Ross Papers.
102. Marmon to Ross, Ibid. Marmon was' a surveyor who came to New Mexico to
work on the Navajo Reservation project. He remained in the Territory to become ~
teacher and trader at Laguna Pueblo. After marrying into the tribe he became its
governor in
Edmund G. Ross, General and Special Messages to the TwenW-Eighth Legislative Assembly of New Mexico (Santa Fe.

103.

1886.

1889).
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done. Naturally they could hinder a Republican governor's
program. The ends to which the legislature was willing to go
to prevent Ross from making any appointments can be seen
in the Act which created the office of "Solicitor General" for
the Territory. This new office virtually appropriated all the
duties of the Attorney General, but was not to be filled until
October, 1889 (after Ross would be safely out of office). Further, any attempt to "impersonate" the Solicitor General's
duties under another title was declared a "felony." Thus if
Ross' appointee to the Attorney General's offic,e carried out
his duties, that was a felonious act. At the same time he
could not appoint a solicitor general. And despite his veto,
the act became law. 1M
In his relations with the 28th Legislature, both Prince and
Twitchell have stressed Ross' lavish use of the veto power.
In 1889 there were in all 145 laws enacted. Of the first 45,
Governor Ross approved 26, three were passed over his veto,
and 16 became valid "by limitation". The relations between the
governor and the legislature being more and more strained, we
find that of the last 100 laws he approved only 21, nine being
passed over vetoes and 70 becoming valid without action by the
governor. 105

By Prince's interpretation, Ross' role was merely that of
an irate negator. They fail to mention that a Ross supporter
and fellow editor, J. A. Kistler, pushed through an intelligent
public school bill only to have it defeated at the last moment
by Tom Catron in a complicated maneuver to garner Republican support for a constitutional convention. l06 Similarly,
Pedro Perea is given credit for ending the vicious speculation
in territorial warrants and reforming New Mexico's financial
system, when it was Ross' close friend and fellow Democrat,
Henry L. Waldo, who drew the bill. Similarly, the legislature
did, with an incredible amount of log-rolling, establish an
asylum, a university, an agricultural and a mining college,
104. Prince, Concise History, pp. 205-206 ; Twitchell, II, 501.
105. Prince, Concise History, Ibid.
106. Ross himself wrote a clear account of the defeat of the Kistler school bill in
a pamphlet entitled: Public Schoo18 and Statehood for New Mexico (March 31, 1890)
which was actually a public letter to Congressman J. S. Struble. Ross Papers.
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and passed Ross' wanted call for a constitutional convention. l07 Ross' administration was not so "barren of result" as
Prince has suggested. Actually, Ross had shown the need for
educational, financial, and land reform which the legislature,
hostile or not, eventually had to acknowledge.. It is indeed
ironic that Governor Prince;s administration is given the
credit for a decent public education law, a workable financial
system, the institution of the Private Court of Land Claims,
and a major attempt at statehood. While Prince did s~cure
these things, in a sense he merely reaped where Ross had
sown.
As always when he was seeking justice, Ross exposed the
Assembly's failures by publishing a broadside letter to New
Mexico at large. In it he lamented the death of the Kistler
school bill which he called a "blunder which falls but little
short of a crime." Determined to separate the sheep from the
goats, he praised his old enemy, Colonel Chavez, for having
supported the bill. l08 Ross' suggested remedy was the same
that he and Burke had proposed six years before: a federally
imposed system of education for the territory. In a prophetic
warning he declared that without public education New
Mexico would never be admitted to the Union. A dozen years
later when Albert Beveridge began his ten year crusade to
prevent New Mexico's admission, the lack of schools was one
of his most telling arguments.109 In a last-minute appreciation
of Ross, an old opponent, the editor of the Deming Headlight,
praised him for his intelligent and courageous stand against
the Legislature,11o
There is no doubt that many of Ross' goals were idealistic
and impracticable given the political and economic conditions
of New Mexico in the late 1880's. He was often too exacting
and blunt in dealing with men who had lived for twenty years
or more on legal intricacies and clever deals. His faith in
public opinion led him to move too openly and to depend on
107. Twitchell, II, 501-502.
108. The New Mexico Interpreter (White Oaks, N. Mex.), March 8, 1889,
109. Ibid. Ross Public Schools and Statehood; see also Charles E. Maddox, The
Statehood Policy of Albert J. Beveridge, 1906-1911. Unpublished Master's Thesis (Department of History, University of New Mexico, 1947),
110. Deming Headlight, March 8, 1889.

GOVERNOR ROSS

.J

207

proclamation, and his faith in automatic regard for good
service was perhaps naIve. Just as he was about to be relieved
of office, he appears to have entertained the hope that his old
senatorial friend, Benjamin Harrison, would keep him on for
a time. But with the Santa Fe politicians barking at his heels,
the new President could do no such thing; and L. Bradford
Prince became governor in Ross' stead. 111
Ross left office, unlike most New Mexican territorial governors a relatively poor man. His friend, S. M. Ashenfelter,
having just purchased the Deming Headlight, offered him a
job on that paper. Ross was to accept the position a year later.
Before that transpired however, Max Frost, Ross' old enemy
came forward to offer him a job on the Santa Fe New Mexican! Twitchell, the New Mexican and the Ross family, all say
that the amazing offer was accepted. 1l2 Ross' purpose appears
to have been to advance the cause of statehood, of which Max
Frost was now the leading editorial advocate in New Mexico.
By this strange alliance, each man paid tribute to the ability
of the other as a foeman worthy of the other's steel. But it was
also Ross' tribute to the power of the press which had so
excoriated him during his four years in office. This ill-fitted
alliance was short-lived, nevertheless, and by 1890 the New
Mexican called the late governor "that thick-skinned bundle
of conceit at Deming.'~113 Relations between them had returned to normal, it seems.
Ross spent the remainder of his life preoccupied with his
dream of a populous, agricultural New Mexico. Appropriately, he became the Secretary of the Territorial Board of
Immigration, and a writer of articles in behalf of irrigation.
In later years, he turned more and more to a history of that
great moment in his life: Andrew Johnson's impeachment,
which he wanted to treat in a full length account. Troubled
by failing eyesight and poor health, he.nevertheless managed
to publish a work on the famous trial in 1896. But Ross was
dissatisfied with his own account and was still redrafting a
111. Ross left office April 2. 1889. Pomeroy. Territories and the U.S.• p. 110.
112. Twitchell. II. 497n. ; Leis, "Memoirs of Ross" ; Santa Fe New Mexican, January
8. 1890.
113. Ibid.
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manuscript of the earlier version when he died in 1907.114

* * * *'
One may ask: what is the significance of Ross as the chief
executive of New Mexico? He was, first of all, a transitional
governor who realized that it was high time the territory
began to move towards economic maturity and statehood and
away from an economic and political colonial status. Always
advocating railroads and mining as well as agriculture, he
laid the foundations-or at least they were formed while he
was in office-fora new economy. As one student of New
Mexican history has Qbserved :
The time between 1880 and 1900 may be called the beginning of the present type of economy in New Mexico and the arid
Southwest, for the arrival of the Santa Fe [Railroad] heralded
the replacement of mercantile capitalis~ by the industrial cap, italism still present today.... [An] ... economic theory which
appears to have been borne out in New Mexico in this period is
that as a region progresses from an underdeveloped one, the
inequality of income diminishes.

Heath estimates that in the period 1880 to 1900 property
values in New Mexico increased 372.5 per cent with no population explosion, to accompany it. 1l5 Whether successful or
not, Ross' own economic program was designed to bring about
just such beneficial changes as Heath has described.
The veteran Kansas Free Soiler also had the faith that he
could remake New Mexico just as he and his friends had
"shaped" Kansas while defeating the slavery interests. Ross,
then, was a creature of habit, for his teehniques were the
familiar ones of the abolitionist crusade by printed word, the
"reconstruction" of society (in the Radical Republican sense
of that phrase) by land reform, and finally by political democratization. He also had faith in the power of the federal government to do anything for the general welfare. To these
elements he added a belief in a powerful executive. While he
114. Leis, "Memoirs of Ross." See also Ross, Hi8tOTl/ of the Impeachment of Andrew
Johnson •• • fOT High Crime8 and Mi8demeanOTB in Office (Santa Fe, 1896).
116. Jim Heath, A Study of the Influence of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad Upon the Economy of New Mexico, 1878 to 1900. Unpublished'Master's Thesis
(Department of Economics, University of New Mexico. 1955), p. 6 and p. 168.
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failed to reconstruct this second territorial home in the fabled
land of Montezuma, a perusal of the records would indicate
that his failure was due not so much to the stubbornness and
antagonizing qualities as it was to a weak and divided Democratic party, an able and sometimes brilliant opposition by
Republican leaders, and too great haste.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that Ross was
not exactly a voice crying in the wilderness. While he was in
office Congress was busy using radical reconstruction techniques in Utah in order to end polygamy and curb the power
of the Mormon Church. In Wyoming Territory Governor
Thomas Moonlight was defending the "nester" against the
cattlemen, and behind them all stood a reformist Department
of Interior. Just as he was leaving office, Ross' heroes-the
farmers-had begun to form alliances in the Middle West and
in New Mexico itself to fight for reforms of their own.
On the local level, however, Ross retired from office under
conditions similar to those Andrew Johnson had experienced
during his last year in the White House: shorn of his appointment powers by tenure of office acts and hampered by a hostile
legislature. But "Montezuma" Ross at least had the grim
pleasure of knowing that he had given the political and economic old guard in New Mexico an "Indian scare" they would
not soon forget and would some day appreciate. In the entire
history of American territorial government after the Civil
War Ross alone appears to have sought to make the traditionally weak position of governor powerful-and through
that medium work to revamp the economic and political structure of a vast region. His failure was not nearly so significant
as his dream.

116. For evidence of the Farmers' Alliance movement in New Mexico see the Raton
Daily Independe'nt, February 28, 1889. (Bancroft.)
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THE PRESIDIO SUPPLY PROBLEM OF
NEW MEXICO IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY*
By MAX L. MOORHEAD

T

HE Presidial Company of Santa Fe, usually numbering
above one hundred officers and men, constituted one of
the most remote garrisons on New Spain's northern frontier
during the eighteenth century. Regular troops serving there
faced not only the ordinary military dangers of campaigning
in rugged terrain against hostile Indians but also the moraleshaking economic perils of indebtedness. They almost never
received sufficient income to cover their expenses. The problem was general all along the northern frontier, and although
it was never satisfactorily solved, the higher authorities, from
the King down to the Comandante General; fully realized the
seriousness of the situation and repeatedly attacked the difficulties. Some improvement was attained before the close of
the century, but most of the reforms that were instituted
changed procedures rather than conditions.
At first the frontier troops were paid their salaries in
cash and were allowed to buy their provisions and equipment
from local or itinerant merchants as best they could. In their
remote posts, however, they were soon at the mercy of a few
tradesmen whose prices were under little if any official restraint. Unable to cover these mounting costs with their own
fixed pay, the soldiers fell into a steadily increasing debt.
During the seventeenth century a new practice was developed
wherein the purchase of provisions was centralized in the
captains of the presidial companies. It was supposed that
these officers could bargain with the merchants more effectively than could the individual soldiers. Also during the
seventeenth century half of the salaries of these troops, and
sometimes the entire amount, was paid in provisions rather
than cash. Not only did this reduce the treasury's risk and
• This study was made possible by a grant-in-aid from thc Faculty Research Committee of the University of Oklahoma.
Dr. Moorhead is Professor of History. University of Oklahoma. Norman.
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difficulty in transporting specie to the isolated presidios but
it also, in theory at least, prevented the troops from overspending for their needs. In practice it did not. The company
, captains, who were sometimes also the provincial governors,
were as rapacious as the merchants. They bought the provisions from private tradesmen at one price and sold them to
the soldiers, or charged them against their salaries, at a
much higher rate. Thus, while these officials profited enormously, the troops sank even more deeply in debt. 1
In New Mexico, the Presidial Company of Santa Fe had
authorized Captain Felix Martinez and a local merchant,
Pedro Otero, to purchase its provisions. The Marques de
Pefiuela, who was at once governor of the province and commandant of the presidio, bought a large copsignment of goods
in collusion with Martinez and Otero and in 1712 offered them
to the troops at marked-up prices. By withholding the salaries
of the troops, he endeavored to make them sign over 25,000
pesos of their pay to cover the cost of .tl1is merchandise. 2 As
many of the soldiers were already in debt to him, Governor
Pefiuela also forced the entire garrison to sign a waiver on
their salaries of ten pesos apiece. This was to cover the debts
of any of their comrades who might die while still owing him
for provisions. Complaining of this practice, the troops petitioned Pefiuela's successor, Juan Ignacio Flores Mogollon, to
cancel the power of attorney which they had previously given
Captain Martinez and Otero. These, they charged, had failed
to comply with their agreement to furnish their provisions
1. Well-documented studies demoJstrating the abuses in the provisioning of the
troops in northern New Spain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries include
the following: Francisco R. Almada (ed.), Informe de Hugo de O'Conor sobre el estado
de !<¥l Provincias Intemas del Norte, 1771-1776 (Mexico. 1952) ; Carlos E. Castaneda
et al., Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1996 (7 vola., Austin, 1936-1958) ; Charles
E. Chapman, The Founding of Spanish California: The Northwestward Expansion of
New Spain. 1687-1789 (New York, 1916) ; Charles W. Hackett (ed.), Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, and Approaches Thereto, to 1779 (3
vola., Washington, 1923-1937) ; Lawrence Kinnaird (ed.), The Frontiers of. New Spain:
Nicol6.B de Lafora's Description, 1766-1768 (Berkeley, 1959) ; Alfred B. Thomas (ed.),
After Coronado: Spanish Exploration Northeast of New Mexico, i690-17~7 (Norman,
1935); Thomas (ed.), Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New Spain,
1776-1789 (Norman, 1941) ; and Donald E. Worcester (ed.), Instructions for Governing
the Interior Provinces of New Spain, 1786, by Bernardo de Gdlvez (Berkeley, 1951).
2. Soldiers of the presidio of Santa Fe, petition to the Cabildo, August I, 1712,
Spanish Archives of New Mexico, at Santa Fe (Hereinafter cited as SANM), archive 177.
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at cost.3 Later the same year, the Viceroy intervened with an
order prohibiting the governors from withholding the salaries
of the troops, applying this money to payment of their debts,
or obligating them to purchase supplies they had not ordered. 4
Curiously, the garrison at Santa Fe petitioned the Viceroy
not to apply this regulation to Governor Flores Mogollon
because, they declared, he was supplying them satisfactorily
with all of their needs, and they preferred that he did their
buying rather than Captain Martinez or Otero. According to
Captain Martinez, Governor Flores Mogollon had compelled
the troops to cancel their arrangement with him and Otero.
but the troops contended they had done so of their own free
will. They had, they said, suffered considerable arrears from
Martinez's purchases. 5 Reiterating this position in 1715, the
troops declared that Martinez's allegations-that the troops
had been under duress when they revoked their concession to
Martinez and Otero and that they had suffered no indebtedness while they and Governor Pefiuela were provisioning
them-were both malicious and false. They maintained that
they had come to owe Governor Pefiuela 75,000 pesos and
Otero 18,664 pesos under that arrangement and that, after
deductions had been made from their salaries, they still
owed the former 44,000 pesos. 6
When Captain Martinez became governor ad interim of
New Mexico in October of 1715, he immediately arrested
Flores Mogollon and accused him of gross mal-administration.
While these charges were being investigated, Flores Mogollon languished in prison at Mexico City for more than two
years. According to Martinez, Flores Mogollon had not only
charged the soldiers extravagant prices for their provisions
but had also attempted to sell them the same goods they had
already paid for with deductions from their salaries. 7 Governor Martinez himself was shortly removed from office for
3. Soldiers of the Presidio of Santa Fe, petition to the Governor Juan Ignacio Flores
Mogollon, November 2,1712, SANM, archive 183b.
4. Soldiers of the Presidio of Santa Fe, representation to the Viceroy, July 16, 1718,
SANM, archive 192a.
6. Ibid.
6. Presidio of Santa Fe, junta proceedings, May 27, 1715, SANM, archive 219.
7. Juan de OJivan Revolledo (Auditor of New Spain) to the Viceroy, Mexico City,
September 22, 1723, in Thomas (ed.), After Coronado, 189.
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similar offenses. Among other things he was accused of owning a mercantile establishment at Santa Fe while he was in
office, a flagrant violation of royal law, and of supplying the
troops with provisions at marked-up prices instead of at cost,
as his agreement with the troops required. His storekeeper
was Juan Paez Hurtado, himself a former governor. 8
Subsequently, Martinez charged that his successor, Governor Antonio Valverde y Cossio, profiteered in a similar
manner and that he withheld the salaries of the troops to
cover their debts for provisions which he furnished. 9 Whether
or not this was true, the officers and men of the Santa Fe
garrison praised the administration of Valverde. When he
left office in 1722, they urged the Viceroy to instruct his successor, Juan Domingo de Bustamente, to continue Vaiverde's
practice of discounting from their annual pay fifty pesos
. apiece and applying this toward the purchase of their provisions,This, they declared, prevented them from going further
into debt. 10
In 1724 when the Viceroy commissioned Brigadier Pedro
de Rivera to inspect the presidios of the northern provinces,
he specifically instructed him to investigate the supply problem. Among other things Rivera was directed to ascertain
the cost of transporting provisions to each of the garrisons,
to compare the prices charged the troops with those current
in nearby towns, and to prevent the captains and governors
from overcharging the soldiers for these supplies. This last
abuse and others had reportedly been committed over the
past twenty years.u Although the presidial soldiers were
then paid an average of 450 pesos a year, one fourth of this
amount never reached them, according to the Viceroy, for the
salaries were paid in goods, and the captains, in connivance
with the merchants, had been charging exhorbitant prices for
these provisions. 12 The major result of Rivera's inspection
8. Judgement in resideneia of Governor Felix Martinez, Santa Fe, AU~6t 16, 1723,
SANM, archive 322.
9. Martinez to the Viceroy [Mexico City, 1720l, in Thomas (ed.), After CoronadtJ,
177-187.
10. Soldiers of the Presidio of Santa Fe, petition to the Viceroy, March 15, 1722,
SANM, archive 315.
1L Castaneda, QlL,. Catholic Heritage. II, 216-219.
12. Ibid., II, 211-214.
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and report was the adoption of a newpresidial code, the Reglamento of 1729. One requirement of this ordinance was that
maximum-price lists be posted at each garrison with equitable
rates assigned to the commodities most commonly ordered
by the troops.13
The price ceilings thus established seem to have done little
to protect the soldiers, at least in New Mexico. In 1760 a
Franciscan missionary reported that thepresidials at Santa
Fe had to pay 150 pesos a year for clothing of the poorest
quality and another 250 pesos for other provisions, some of
which they had not ordered. They were usually charged
double the current price for local produce: 3% silver pesos
instead of 2 for a fanega of corn, 4 for wheat instead of 2, 8
for beans instead of 4, and so on with meat, chili, and the
like.H In 1760 and again in 1764 the Viceroy found it necessary to convoke juntas at Mexico City to regulate prices
.charged the presidials, and the general inspection of the
northern garrisons made by the Marques de Rubi from 1766
to 1.768 produced an extensive file of testimony on these overcharges. 15 The main source of discontent among the troops,
Rubi reported, was that they were paid in goods instead of
incash. 16
As a result of these findings, the Viceroy orgered in 1768
that the presidials be paid in cash. In New Mexico, however,
Governor Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta. appealed for exemption fr,om this requirement on the ground that there was never
sufficient specie in his provin«e to meet the pay roll, and this
dispensation was granted in 1769. 17
The new Reglamento of 1772, growing out of Rubi's inspection and report, brought about a major reform in the
presidio supply system. Henceforth, under penalty of removal
from office and denial of further employment in the royal
service, the presidial captains and provincial governors were
13. Ibid., II, 220, 235.
14. Fray Juan Sanz de Lezaun, "Account of the Lamentable Happenings in New
Mexico." November 4, 1760, in Hackett (ed.l, Historical Documents Relating to New
Merico, III, 468-479.
15. Chapman, Founding of Spanish California, 141-142.
16. Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage, IV, 243.
17. Viceroy Marques de Croix to Governor Pedro Fermin de Mendinueta, Mexico
City, January 28, 1769, SANM, archive 644.
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to cease managing the payment of the troops' salaries and the
purchase and distribution of their provisions. These functions were now vested in oficiales habilitados, non-commissioned officers elected by the officers and men of their companies for three-year terms. These paymasters were empowered to buy the goods ordered by the troops at wholesale
prices and to distribute them at this cost plus only 2 per cent,
an amount considered sufficient to cover their expenses. After
making the corresponding deductions for these purchases, the
retirement pay, and rations, the paymasters were supposed
to pay the troops the balance of their annual salaries in cash,
half of it in January and half in July.18
Provisioning the troops through elected paymasters instead of captains or governors did not solve the problem. The
non-commissioned officers who were elected were often ignorant of accounting procedures and lacking in purchasing experience. They frequently bought the provisions at artificially
advanced prices, suffered serious losses in transporting them
to the presidios, and, through either dishonesty or incompetence, allowed their bookkeeping records to become hopelessly
out of balance. As a result, one bankruptcy followed another,
leaving the troops in debt and short of food, clothing, and
ammunition. 19 Apparently the paymasters were unable to fill
all of the orders of the troops, for some soldiers bought directly from private merchants and charged the purchases against
the presidial payroll. In 1780 the Comandante General at
Chihuahua decreed that henceforth merchants were no longer
permitted to solicit his office for payment of debts owed by
soldiers who had purchased goods on their individual credit.
Compensation in such transactions would be made only when
there was a sufficient balance in the debtor's individual salary
account. 20
Beginning experimentally in 1781 and regularly in 1783,
18. Comandante Inspector Hugo de O'Conor, Informe, 1771-1776 (Almada, ed.),
73-76; Chapman, Founding of Spanish California, 142; Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage.
IV, 290-291.
19. Juan de Ugalde (Governor of Coahuila) to Comandante General Teodoro de
Croix, Hacienda de Sardinas, March
(copy), Archivo General y Publico de la
Nacion, at Mexico City, Provincias Internas, Vol. 13 (Hereinafter cited as AGN, Provo
Int., 13), folios 411-413 ; Thomas (ed.), Teodoro de Croix, 13-14.
Teodoro de Croix, band<>, Arispe, May
SANM, archive

12, 1782

, 20.
I

1, 1780,

788.
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the Comandante General abandoned the paymaster system
for purchasing provisions and let regular contracts to private
merchants. Each of these was assigned to one or two presidios
for a period of three years. 21 In Nueva Vizcaya and New
Mexico, while the presidial paymasters were supposed to have
charged the troops 2 per cent above the wholesale prices of
the provisions at Chihuahua, the new merchant contractors
were allowed to charge the higher retail prices there. Under
this arrangement no bankruptcies occurred, but by 1786,
when the contracts were about to expire, it was evident that
the salaries of the troops would not support these higher
costS. 22 The Comandante General therefore asked the contractors to revise their rates downward, but each of them
complained that he could not do so and still make a profit,
and some said they were already losing money,23 As a temporary solution to the problem, the Comandante General allowed
the contracts to lapse and reverted to the paymaster system
to tide the troops over the next year, 1787. He then entertained bids for new contracts for the succeeding years. 24
The most attractive of the new offers came from Francisco
de Guizarnotegui, a member of the mercantile guild of Chihuahua who had been provisioning the presidio of Carrizal
and one of the patrol companies of Nueva Vizcaya under one
of the three-year contracts just terminated. Guizarnotegui
offered to provision all sev~n of the presidios of Nueva Vizcaya, the four patrol companies of that province, and the
presidio of New Mexico as well for a period of five years under
certain stipulated conditions. 25 The other merchants of the
Chihuahua guild, acting jointly, countered with a bid of their
own, but after revising his own proposals twice to meet this
21. Ugalde to Croix, March 12, 1782; Francisco Xavier del Campo (Corregidor),
deposition, Chihuahua, September 5, 1786, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fols. 411-413, 53-55.
22. Del Campo, deposition, September 5, 1786; Comandante Inspector Joseph de
Rengel to Comandante General Joaquin Ugarte y Loyola, Chihuahua, November 11,
1786; Pedro Galindo Navarro (Auditor of Provincias Internas) to Ugarte, Chihuahua,
December 2, 1786, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fois. 53-55, 55-57, 57-59.
23. Del Campo, deposition, September 5, 1786, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fois. 53-55.
24. Rengel to Ugarte, Chihuahua, October 3, 1786; Ugarte to Viceroy Bernardo de.
Giilvez, Chihuahua, October 12, 1786, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fols. 405-406, 402-404.
25. Francisco de Guizarn6tegui, propositions, Chihuahua, October 30, 1786, AGN,
Provo Int., 13, fois. 51-53.
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competition,26 Guizarnotegui was awarded the contract on
February 17, 1787.
As this monopoly arrangement' shortly came under an
investigation which yielded a large file of documents on the
whole supply problem, it is now possible to explore the subject
in some depth. The contract itself was composed of the following ten conditions:
1) For a period of five years, dating from January 1,1788,
the contractor would fill all of the orders of the presidios and
posts of Nueva Vizcaya and New Mexico for merchandise
from Vera Cruz, Puebla, Jalapa, Mexico City, and Queretaro.
He would charge the troops the original cost of these goods,
the purchasing commission of 4 per cent (which was customarily charged by buyers at Mexico City), the freightage, losses
in transit, and excise taxes.
2) He would transport this merchandise from Mexico City
to Chihuahua at the old freight rate of 16 reales per arroba
(two dollars per twenty-five pounds), which was 4 reales less
than the rate then current.
3) He would also transport the goods from Chihuahua to
the individual presidios and posts, except that of Santa Fe, at
4 reales per arroba below the current rate. The New Mexican
garrison would receive its deliveries at Chihuahua, as had
been its custom in the past, and the others could also collect
theirs at the same place if they wished to employ their own
mules and thus save on the freightage cost from Chihuahua
to their stations.
4) In order to make his deliveries on schedule, the contractor would have to receive all of the order lists of the companies at the beginning of each year and with ,the endorsements of the Comandante Inspector.
5) The merchandise, on reaching Chihuahua and before
departing for the presidios and posts, would have to be inspected by the contractor and the Comandante Inspector, or
26. Cuerpo de Comercio, propositions, Chihuahua, ·January 10, 1787; Guizarn6tegui,
propositions, Chihuahua, January 27, 1787; Cuerpo de Comercio, propositions. February
3, 1787; Guiza:rn6tegui, propositions, February 7, 1787; Cuerpo de Comercio, waiver,
February 14, 1787, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fois. 63-67, 73-75, 77-78, 90-94, 104.
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their agents, and be certified by them as having met the specifications in the order lists.
6) The contractor would also provide produce from the
province of Michoacan, purchasing this at Chihuahua at the
lowest prices available and delivering it to the presidios and
posts at that cost plus a commission of 2 112 per cent.
7) He would deliver the Michoacan goods to the presidios
and posts at 4 reales perarroba less than the current freight
rate except, as indicated in the 3rd condition, that New
Mexico's presidio would receive its orders at Chihuahua and
that the other garrisons could receive theirs there if they so
desired.
8) In order to make his purchases in time for the scheduled deliveries, the contractor would make a prudent estimate
from the order lists of the costs of the goods, commissions,
excise taxes, and freightage, and one year in advance of his
purchases funds in the amount of the total estimate would be
delivered to him by the royal treasurer at Chihuahua in warrants against the treasury at Mexico City.
9) When the merchandise was purchased and delivered
at Chihuahua accompanied by the original invoices, the excise
tax would be paid at the customs house there, and the total
account for the year would be liquidated. The treasurer at
Chihuahua would then pay the contractor or receive from him
whatever was due either in case the original estimates and
. actual costs did not balance. The treasurer and the respective
paymasters would then discount from the payroll of each
presidial and patrol company the amount it owed for the
merchandise received.
10) The presidios would be responsible for furnishing the
contractor's mule trains with competent military escort on
the roads to and from their stations--:from EI Pasaje onward
for merchandise purchased in Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Puebla,
Mexico City; and Queretaro and from Chihuahua onward for
the goods of Michoacan. The contractor would request these
escorts fifteen or twenty days in advance, and they would be
provided without delay so as to avoid the expense of detaining the trains. If the contractor should be unable to make all
of the deliveries beyond EI Pasaje in a single trip, escorts
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would be furnished for as many as two others.
From almost the very beginning Guizarnotegui's operations in provisioning the presidios were embarassed by official
intervention and financial difficulties. Before the contractor
was able to cash the warrants issued for his purchases, pay~
ment on them was suspended by the royal treasury at Mexico
City, and the entire contract was held in abeyance pending
the result of a full-scale investigation. The Comandante General, it developed, had failed to go through proper channels
in letting it. During the previous year the King had reformed
the administrative system for his realms, and under this new
order such military and treasury matters as the'provisioning
of the troops were supposedly under the jurisdiction of new
officials known as intendants. The Intendant of Durango
should have been consulted before Guizarn6tegui's contract
was approved. Eventually the contract was approved, by the
Viceroy on September 10, 1788, and by the King on June 8,
1789, but it was not until September of the latter year that
Guizarn6tegui was assured that treasury funds would be
issued for his purchases. 28
Meanwhile, for two and a half years, Guizarn6tegui operated without either a valid contract or adequate funds and
had to purchase the provisions for the troops on his own
credit. In so doing he had to pay the wholesale merchants at
Mexico City a premium of 9 per cent for credit extended to
January, when the troops were paid, and an additional 5 per
cent for what was still due thereafter. Being unwilling to
absorb this loss himself, Guizarn6tegui merely added it to the
total bill against,the troops.29 The Comandante General approved this procedure for the deliveries of the first year, 1788,
but he instructed Guizarn6tegui that thereafter when funds
were not delivered to him'in advance, he should obtain his
credit at5 per cent interest by g"uaranteeing the salaries of
the troops as his security. This Guizarn6tegui did not do be~
27. Contract with Guizarn6tegui, Chihuahua, February 17, 1787, AGN, Provo Int" 13,
fols. 106-111.
28. Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores to Ugarte, Mexico City, September 10, 1788;
Royal order, Aranjuez, June 8,1789; Flores to Ugarte, Mexico City, September 20,1789;
AGN, Provo Int., 13, fols. 166-167, 203, 204-205. The documentation on the jurisdictional
dispute appears in folios 1-207.
29. Guizarnotegui to the Viceroy, Mexico City, April 16, 1789, AGN, Provo Int., 13,
fols. 181-182.
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cause, as he said, the merchants at Mexico City, knowing his
contract still lacked official approval, questioned the validity
of such a guarantee. 30 He therefore continued to pay 9 per
cent for the first year of his credit and an additional 5 per cent
for extension beyond that term and also to charge this interest to the account of the troops.31
For the provisions of the Presidio of Santa Fe for the first
year, 1788, delivered to its paymaster at Chihuahua in Febru~
ary,32 Guizarnotegui presented a bill for 17,655 pesos and 6%
reales and received from the paymaster 13,648 pesos. This left
a balance due of 4,007 pesos and 6 112 reales plus an interest of
5 per cent for the extension of credit amounting to 200 pesos
and 3 reales. According to Guizarnotegui's accounting, therefore, the presidio still owed him 4,208 pesos and 1% reales:
Cost of merchandise purchased in Jalapa, Puebla,
Mexico City, and Queretaro
13,357 pesos, 2% reales
Purchasing commission (4%)
534
214
Premium for credit for
one year (9%)
1,202
114
Freightage (437 arrobas and 211!z
pounds at 18 reales
per arroba)
985
1
Cost of merchandise from Michoacan.
purchased at Chihuahua
,......
1,576
7%
Total
Less payment on account,
February 19, 1788,

17,655

61!z

13,648

Balance due
.
Premium for extended credit (5%) ..

4,007
200

Balance due January 1, 1789

4,208

.

61!z
3

Since the amount paid in February was well over the price
of the goods from Jalapa, Puebla, Mexico cIty and Queretaro
(13,357 pesos) , and since this merchandise was purchased on
30. Justo Pastor de Madariaga (Guizarn6tegui's agent) to Ugarte, Chihuahua,
[July. 1789], AGN, Provo Int., 13 fols. 245-269.
31. Presidio of Santa Fe, account against Guizarnotegui for supplies furnished in
1788, 1789, and 1790, Santa Fe, July 8, 1790, SANM, archive 1084a.
32. Presidio of Santa Fe. resume of invoice received from Guizarnotegui on Febru,;,
ary 19, 1788. in ibid.
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credit in October of 1787, the interest of 9 per cent should not
have run for an entire year but only for four months, until
February, when the paymaster received the goods and paid
the contractor. Therefore, when the Presidial Company of
Santa Fe audited the account, it claimed a reduction of 801
pesos and 2 5/ 6 reales from the bill, as interest unj ustly
charged for two-thirds of a year. By the same token, it
claimed an additional 40 pesos and 1;2 real as the corresponding overcharge for interest on the amount due after the first
of the year. Moreover, since the contract stipulated a freight
rate of 16 reales per arroba and Guizarnotegui had charged
18 reales, the presidio claimed an overcharge of 109 pesos and
3% reales on this item. And finally, Guizarnotegui .had
charged the troops 500 pesos for 5,000 loaves of brown sugar
from Michoacan, at the rate of ten loaves to the peso, while
on the same occasion he had sold the same commodity to Jose
Ortiz, a merchant of Santa Fe, at the rate of 18 to the peso.
Therefore, the presidio claimed, a further reduction from its
bill of 222 pesos and 2 reales was in order. Altogether its
claims against Guizarnotegui's bill for the year amounted to
1,173 peso!;? and 1 1 / 12 reales. 33
For the second year, 1789, Guizarnotegui presented the
New Mexican garrison with a higher and even more questionable bill :34
Cost of merchandise purchased in Jalapa, Puebla,
Mexico City, and Queretaro
14,166 pesos, 3% reales
Purchasing commission (4 0/0)
566
5
Premium for credit for
one year (9 0/0)
1,325
Freightage (547 arrobas and 11
pounds at 16 reales
per arroba)
1,094
7
"
17,153 pesos, 6% reales
Cost of merchandise from Michoacan
purchased at Chihuahua
Total

,.......................

1,737

6%,

18,891 pesos, 5 % reales

33. Presidio of Santa Fe, notations to same. in ibid.
84. Presidio of Santa Fe. resume of invoice received from Guizarn6tegui on February
3, 1789, in ibid.
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When these deliveries were made at Chihuahua in February, 1789, the paymaster of Santa .Fe provided reimbursement in the amount of 16,300 pesos and 23,4 real, leaving a
balance of 2,591 pesos and 2% reales due. The paymaster
then made out a promissory note to Guizarnotegui for 2,656
pesos and % real to cover this and the interest due on the
balance. 35
After auditing this bill the Santa Fe company tookseveral exceptions to it. The premium of 9 per cent for credit had
been charged not only on the original cost of the goods in the
interior cities but also on the purchasing commission as well,
which had not been the case in the bill of the previous year.
The presidio thus claimed 47 pesos and 3 reales for the overcharge. Further, as in the previous bill, this interest was
charged for an entire year whereas the purchases had been
made on October 31, 1788, and the reimbursement on February 3, 1789. Therein lay an overcharge of 949 pesos and 1 7/12
real. Likewise the interest on what was still due should have
been reduced by 47 pesos and 4 reales. Finally, in comparing
the prices Guizarnotegui charged the presidio for Michoacan
goods with what he had charged Ortiz and another merchant
of Santa Fe, Jose Rafael Sarracino, the troops claimed another 234 pesos and 7 3;4; reales. In all, these claims for the
year amounted to 1,279 pesos and 1/ 3 real. 36
For 1790, the third year of the contract, Guizarnotegui's
bill, for some reason, did not include freightage on the merchandise purchased in the interior or the cost of the goods
from Michoacan :37
Cost of merchandise purchased in Jalapa, Puebla,
Mexico City, and Queretaro
_... 13,010 pesos, 2% reales
Purchasing commission (4 %) .._.
520
3%

Less amount issued in advance
of purchases ..__.
__
Balance due

__.._

_. __.. _.

.__.

13,530

5%,

5,943

4%

7,587

1%

35. Ibid.
36. Presidio of Santa Fe, notations to same, in ibid.
37. Presidio of Santa Fe, resume of invoice received from Guizarnotegui on February
10. 1790, in ibid.
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Premium for credit for
one year (9%)
Total

.

682
8,269 pesos, 7 %, reales

The bill for the Michoacan goods was apparently made out
separately, but when Guizarnotegui presented the above at
Chihuahua, he received 5,171 pesos and 7~ reales, leaving a
balance due on January 1, 1791, of 3,098 pesos and 1;2 real.
To this was to be added 154 pesos and 7lj2 reales as the 5 per
cent interest for the extension of credit on the new balance.
Once agaiil the presidio challenged Guizarnotegui's charge
of 9 per cent interest on the purchasing commission in addition to the original cost of the goods, claiming for this item a
reduction of 46 pesos and 6 2/ 3 reales. And again it sought
to reduce the period of this interest from a full year to less
than four months, since the credit ran only from October 14,
1789, to February 10, 1790. For this latter the claim amounted
to 242 pesos and % real, and for the corresponding overcharge on the 5 per cent premium, 12 pesos and 5/G real. The
presidio also challenged the purchasing commission for goods
bought at Puebla, since this was covered by that paid in Mexico City, and also the freightage from Puebla,to Mexico City,
which had not been charged in previous years. These claims
amou'nted to 134 pesos and 53,4 reales. A comparison of Guizarnotegui's prices on worsted goods bought at Queretaro and
blankets at Puebla justified a further claim of 148 pesos and
31;2 reales. The total amount of the bill for Michoacan goods
does not appear either in this billing or in the presidio~s
.claims, but the latter, by comparing Guizarnotegui's prices
with those at which the Chihuahua merchants Francisco
Elguea and Savino de la Pedrueza sold them to Ortiz and
Sarracino of Santa Fe, itemized overcharges totaling 59
pesos and 43,4 reales for brown sugar loaves and soap from
that province. Thus, for 1790 the claims amounted to 643
pesos and 5% reales. 38
The total claims for the three years, which the presidio
filed against Guizarnotegui on July 8, 1790, amounted to 3,095
3~.

Presidio of Santa Fe, notations to same, in ibid.
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pesos and 7 1 / 6 reales, or approximately 6 per cent of the
total bill for that period. Nor was this the full extent of the
contractor's grief. There were the claims of the seven presidios and four patrol posts of Nueva Vizcaya. And even before
the garrisons audited their bills, the Comandante Inspector
and his agents at Chihuahua were scrutinizing Guizarnotegui's deliveries.
Only minor adjustments had to be made in the deliveries
of 1788, but in the following year complications set in. Guizarnotegui's mule trains from the interior arrived at Chihuahua just as the military escorts from Carrizal, San Elizeario,and Santa Fe were preparing to return to their posts.
This left no time for an inspection of the goods at Chihuahua
for those presidios and so these packages were not opened
or properly inspected until they were out of the contractor's
hands and beyond the scrutiny of the Comandante Inspector's
agents. 39 The best the Comandante General could do was to
call upon the paymasters of these three presidios to send back
to Chihuahua at a later date samples of the goods thus received. On the basis of these samples the quality, quantity, and
pricing of the original deliveries were then reviewed by three
merchants : one representing the interests of the presidios,
one those of the contractor, and the third acting as referee
when disputes arose. 40 Guizarnotegui complained that it was
improper to judge the yardage goods he had delivered from
remnants' submitted by the presidios, for there was no guarantee that they were taken from the material actually delivered and also because a remnant of a piece of dry goods might
.be cut from the end of a bolt and thus be inferior in quality to
the whole piece,41 Nevertheless, the inspection continued
under these circumstances. Samples of Guizarnotegui's deliveries were compared with similar merchandise in the shops
at Chihuahua, and the corresponding invoices were checked
for price variation. In some instances the goods delivered by
Guizarnotegui could not be matched with those in the local
39. Ayudante Inspector Diego de Borica to Ugarte, Chihuahua, February 17, 1789,
AGN, Prov. Int., 13, foJ. 212.
40. Ugarte, deer"';, Chihuahua, May 18, 1789, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fols. 234-235.
41. Guizarnotegui to Borica [Mexico City, January, 1790], AGN, Provo Int., 13,
fo!. 307.
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shops, but where comparisons were possible, it was found that
Guizarnotegui had overcharged the troops on twenty categories of yardage goods. 42
Of greater concern was the matter of the 9 per cent premium which Guizarnotegui had added to the bill to cover the
purchases he had to make on credit. Although he had no
authorization from his contract to charge the troops for this
credit, Guizarnotegui was- hardly liable for this burden
himself, for it had arisen only from the failure of the treasury
officers to fulfill their obligation to supply him with adequate
funds a full year in advance of his scheduled deliveries. Since
both parties had failed to comply strictly with their contractual obligations, and since the contract itself was not legally
binding until September, 1789, the whole question of this
liability was left to the decision of the Comandante General.
Finally on April 7, 1790, a ruling was handed down from that
quarter:
Guizarnotegui would be compensated for the premium of
9 per cent only for the purchases he made on credit between
July 1 and December 31, 1787; that is, for the merchandise
he delivered early in 1788. For his purchases between January
1,1788, and December 31, 1789, which were delivered,early
in 1789 and 1790, he was entitled to only 5 per cent for his
credit. And for 1791 and 1792, the remaining two years of his
contract (now that it was fully in force), he was prohibited
from charging any interest at all, even when funds were not
supplied a full year in advance, as long as he should receive
this money in ample time to make his deliveries on schedule.
This, the Comandante General declared, was the true spirit
of the 8th condition of the contract. As for the claims against
Guizarnotegui in the liquidation of his accounts for the first
three years of the contract, these would be determined by the
merchants already appointed by himself and the Comandante
Inspector as agents and ,referee. 43
At this point, April 7, 1790, the file of documents accumulated during the investigation ends. There is nothing there of
42. Diego de Borica, Joseph Antonio de Iribarren (representing Guizarn6tegui).
and Manuel Ruiz (representing the troops), Estado de Precios, Chihuahua, March 17,
1790, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fol. 319.
43. Ugarte, decree, Chihuahua, April 7, 1790, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fol. 380.
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later date to indicate how this ruling affected Guizarnotegui.
However, from the presidial records at Santa Fe, it is apparent that Guizarnotegui did not continue as the contractor for
the remainder of his five-year term. In acknowledging receipt
of the New Mexican presidio's claims against Guizarnotegui
for the first three years, the Comandante General in July,
1790, referred to him as the "former contractor."44 Then,
three months later, he distributed to the presidios copies of
a new contract which had just been drawn up at Chihuahua. 45
In this new arrangement not one but nine merchants, all
members of the mercantile guild of Chihuahua, undertook to
supply the presidios for the single year 1791. The stipulations
of this were so much less generous to th~ troops than those in
Guizarnotegui's contract that it might well be presumed that
the former contractor had cancelled his service on his own
free will and that the Comandante General had been forced
to seek other, less advantageous, arrangements because of the
press of time. At any rate the contract for 1791 provided that
the nine merchants would supply the troops with whatever
merchandise of prime necessity from Castile, Puebla, Mexico
City, and Queretaro that they carried in their stores; that
they would furnish these at original cost plus 6 per cent; that
the troops had to assume the 9 per cent premium whenever
purchases had to be made on credit, the 4 per cent commission
charged by purchasing agents at Mexico City, the excise
taxes, and the packing expenses; that the merchants would
bear the losses incurred in transit, but that the troops would
have to provide escorts for the trains from the interior beyond
El' Pasaje and as far as Chihuahua; that the contractors
would supply the troops with the produce of Michoacan at 8
per cent above what they had to pay for it at Chihuahua; that
the troops would have to furnish the contractors with purchasing funds in warrants issued at Chihuahua and cashable
at Mexico City; and that the deliveries of the provisions to
44. Governor Fernando de la Concha to Ugarte, Santa Fe, July 12, 1790; Comandante General Pedro de Nava to De la Concha, Chihuahua, July 26,1790, SANM, archives
1085a, 1137.
45. Contract with Pedro Ramos de Verea, Joseph Antonio de Iribarren, Diego
Ventura Marquez, Ventura Do-Porto, Savino Diego de Ia Pedruesa, Francisco Manuel
, de Elguea, Andres Manuel Martinez, Pablo de Ochoa, and Pedro Yrigoyen (certified
copy), Chihuahua. Ootober 18, 1790, SANM, archive 1120.
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the paymasters would be made at Chihuahua rather than at
the individual presidios. 46
The records of the Presidio of Santa Fe do not indicate.
how this arrangement worked out for the year 1791 or how
the garrison w!1s provisioned thereafter. Some conclusions
on the presidio supply problem in general, however, can be
drawn from the rather full records of the investigation of
Guizarnotegui's contract and its antecedents.
In the first place, it is abundantly evident that the authori,.
ties were sincerely concerned with the welfare of the presidial
soldiers during the eighteenth century, and that it was with
their interests in mind, rather than with those of the royal
treasury or of the economy of the provinces that the supply
system was reformed several times. After centralizing all
purchases in the presidial captains and provincial governors,
the higher authorities established price-ceilings on the provisions, through the Reglamento of 1729. When this measure
failed to provision the troops adequately, fairly, and economically, they promulgated the Reglamento of 1772, which
turned the purchases over to elected paymasters. Then, as
these non-commissioned officers failed to provide goods
cheaply enough for the troops without incurring bankruptcy,
the government, beginning in 1781, let contracts to private
merchants, each supplying one or two presidios. These contracts failed to satisfy either the troops or the merchants
themselves, and so after reverting to the paymaster system
for one year, 1787, the authorities let a monopoly contract for
the several presidios and posts of Nueva Vizcaya and New (
Mexico to a single merchant for the years 1788 through 1792.
This arrangement also proved unsatisfactory to both parties,
and in 1790, as we have seen, it was terminated, and a new
monopoly was let for 1791 to a group of nine merchants.
Each of these reforms was a conscientious attack on the problem even though all seem to have failed somewhat in their
ultimate purpose.
The Guizarnotegui contract broke down for a number of
reasons. First, owing to a purely jurisdictional dispute, the'
contract was not fully in force for the first two and a half
46. Ibid.

228

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

years. Second, because of this, the eighth condition of the
contract (guaranteeing the contractor adequate purchasing
funds a year in advance), was not fulfilled. Third, as the contractor was forced to purchase on credit, a dispute arose over
interest rates. Finally, the Comandante General's ruling on
this question and on the advancement of funds was a violation of the letter, if not the spirit, of the contract. The contractor himself was not blameless in this controversy, however, for his invoices for Santa Fe's presidio show not only
shoddy accounting but also apparent intent to defraud. Not
only did Guizarnotegui attempt to charge interest for an
entire year when he was reimbursed after only four months,
but he also attempted to charge it on his purchasing commission as well as on the cost of the purchases themselves. Some
of his prices were out of line with those current at the same
place and time, and this was especially true of the produce of
Michoacan. According to his contract, he was supposed to
purchase these goods at Chihuahua at the lowest prices available. In fact, however, he bought a large number of these
items from his own store there and at prices well above what
other local merchants were charging. 47
Another significant conclusion may be drawn from analyzing Guizarnotegui's invoices. The itemization of merchandise
delivered shows that the supplies ordered were not primarily
for the military equipment of the soldiers but rather for the
civilian clothing of their families. The invoice for New Mexico's presidio in 1789 illustrates this point. The total bill of
goods from Jalapa, Puebla, Mexico City, and Queretaro for
that year (excluding packing costs, fees, commissions, taxes,
interest, and freightage) amounted to 14,029 pesos. Of this
6,391 pesos (45.5 % of the whole) went for dry goods bought
by the yard or whole piece; 2,862 pesos (20.5ro) for clothing
(mostly feminine) ; 2,739 pesos (19.5%) for blankets and
other bedding; 1,214 (8.5%) for miscellaneous goods; 540
pesos (4.0 %) for hardware; and only 283 pesos (2.0 %) for
saddlery and other military equipment. Of the goods from
Michoacan, amounting to 1,737 pesos, 545 pesos (31.5%)
47. Presidio of Santa Fe, notations to invoice received February 10, 1790, SANM,
archive 1084a.
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went for soap; 470 pesos (27.0%) for brown sugar; and 366
pesos (21.0%) for refined sugar. This left only 356 pesos
(20.5 %) for miscellaneous goods including those of military
utility.48 Arms and ammunition were customarily purchased
by the paymasters directly from the warehouses maintained
by the royal treasury while horses, mules, fodder, and most
of the foodstuffs were bought from the neighboring farms
and ranches. 49 Therefore, the merchant contracts seem to
have had little bearing on the military equipment of the presidial forces. In providing the clothing and household needs of
their families, however, they were vital to troop morale.
Finally, it may properly be assumed that the several reforms during the eighteenth century brought about some improvement in the welfare of presidial troops and their families. Their extreme poverty, a matter of frequent complaint
in earlier years, seems to have been somewhat mitigated by
1789, judging by the luxuries included in their orders for
that year. Imported fabrics (silk, British and Flemish linen,
French velvet, Rouen, Pontevy, Holland cloth, Cambaya, and
English baize) came to 3,345 pesos or almost 24% of the total
bil1. 50 If the salaries of the troops were still inadequate to
cover their expenses, it was due in no small part to their own
conspicuous consumption.

48.

Guizarnotegui, invoice for the Presidio of Santa Fe, Mexico City, October 31,
1788, AGN. Provo Int., 13, fols. 272-274; Presidio of Santa Fe, resume of and notations
to invoice received from Guizarnotegui on February 3, 1789, SANM, archive 1084a.
49. Pedro Galindo Navarro (Auditor of Provincias Internas) to Ugarte, Chihuahua,
February 13, 1787, AGN, Provo Int., 13, fols. 94-102.
50. Guizarn6tegui, invoice for the Presidio of Santa Fe, Mexico City, October 31,
1788, AGN, Provo Int. 13, fols. 272-274.
[NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. Vol. 36, No.3. July, 1961]

FRANK BOND: GENTLEMAN SHEEPHERDER
OF NORTHERN NEW MEXICO, 1883-1915
By FRANI{ H. GRUBBS.

Bond & Weist

As

G. W. Bond & Bro., Wagon Motind, entered its seventh
year of business, ,the advantages of running large flocks
of sheep in the area to the southeast were becoming apparent.
This rolling plateau area in San Miguel and Leonard Wood
Counties drained into the Canadian River on the east and the
,Pecos on the west, providing an abundance of good water and
excellent grazing. 1 The Bonds had already acquired the Trujillo, Mogote, Vermejo, and Esteros ranches, and not long
thereafter they had followed this up by purchasing almost
63,000 acres of the Preston Beck Grant plus the Atencio and
La Posta ranches east of Cabra. 2
As the population of partidarios swelled, and as the
number of independent flockmasters in this vast country
increased, there emerged a distinct requirement for a mercantile store in that area, not only to supply their wants but
also to provide better supervision of the sheep investment
and to establish a local operating base from which to buy
wool. Up to that time, Las Vegas, Wagon Mound, and
Springer had enjoyed much of the trade from the east central
section of the state, but the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific
Railroad was approaching the area .from the east, and the
EI Paso and Northeastern was coming in from the south.
Unless something were done a significant part of that trade
would certainly be lost. A new branch was the obvious solution, and so in the fall of 1899 3 a new G. W. Bond & Bro. store
1. Copy Book No. 695, January 27, 1909, p. 487 (in the files of Bond & Wiest,
Cuervo, New Mexico). Source material at Cuervo cited hereafter as Holbrook Papers.
2. Copy Book, March 7, 1913, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
3. The earli~st account in the first ledger is dated August, 1899, and the first
appearance of Cabra Springs on the G. W. Bond & Bro. letterhead is dated January 1,
1900.
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was open~d at Cabra, New Mexico, in San Miguel County
just twenty-two miles north of Santa Rosa. 4
The reason that Cabra was. chosen is obscure, but it was
a stop on the Pony Express,5 and considering the Bond's emphasis on efficient mail communication and the necessity for
rapid transmission of information between their widely separated stores, it would seem to have been a logical choice.
Some weight was also most certainly given to the possibility
that the railroad would actually come through Cabra and
bring to fruition their plans for exploiting the opportunIties
thus provided. Their subsequent move to Cuervo when the
railroad bypassed Cabra seems to confirm this as a consideration in their choice of Cabra as a store location.
The new business was financed by $10,000 from the
Wagon Mound store, 6 so the parties interested directly in this
expansion were the Wagon Mound partners, George and
Frank Bond. However, in 1899 Archie MacArthur was receiving 5 per cent of the Wagon Mound profits, so his interest
in the Cabra store is not to be discounted.
It appears that the first manager of this store was A. H.
Long who was later to be associated with the Bonds in the
Rosa Mercantile Company.7 While it later became the general
policy upon the opening of a new store to give the manager a
sizable share of the business, this was not done at Cabra as,
indeed, it had not been done at Wagon Mound.
Very little is known of the Cabra business operation; but.
by the summer of 1900 George Bond had decided to make a
change at Cabra and replace Long with Andrew W. Wiest
who was willing to take the managership for one-half the
profits. 8 An account for Andy Wiest first appears in the ledger
on September 5, 1900, and so it would seem that the change
4. U. S., Department of the Interior, General Land Office, Map of Territory of New
Mexico. 1" == 12 mi., 1903. Bond's writings refer variously to "Cabra," and "Cabra
Springs/' It has also been observed as HCabra Springs" in some published material. but
the form, "Cabra," used here appears on the map cited and is considered authoritative.
5. Interview with J. S. Holbrook, Cuervo, New Mexico, March 1, 1958.
6. Records, loco cit.
7. This has not been absolutely substantiated, but examination of the meager cor·
respondence points strongly to this conclusion. The Rosa Mercantile Co. is discussed
infra. chap. xii.
8. Letter of G. W. Bond to Frank Bond, June 13, 1900, Bond Papers, loco cit.
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was promptly made. At the end Of that year, the Cabra store
owed the Wagon Mound store just over $14,000.9
With the advent of Andy Wiest.in 1900 as an eqllal partner with the Bonds, the firm name was changed from G. W.
Bond & Bro. to Bond & Wiest, the name it has borne now for
fifty-eight years. Wiest's share in the business was without
any investment of his own, but by the end of 1901, his first
full year at the helm, Wiest had $3,045.41 in the business
which represented his share of the profits. 10 The first financial
picture of Bond & Wiest that can be reconstructed today is
presented in Table 30.
TABLE 30
BOND & WIEST BALANCE SHEET
January 10, 1902
Resources
Book Accounts
..
$ 4,859.00
Notes
294.84
Sheep on hand
.
2,524.59
Wool.................
9,824.90
Cattle
8.00
Cash
210.90
Merchandise
.
6,575.39
Total
$24,297.62
Liabilities
Due Sundry Persons
$ 343.93
Due G. W. Bond & Bro.
17,844.88
Due A. W. Wiest, profits
3,045.41
Due G. W. Bond & Bro., profits ..
3,045.42
Undivided profits
17.98
Total
(
$24,297.62

The last firm evidenc'e of the store at Cabra is an invoice
dated September 10, 1901. 11 At some time between this date
and the end of 1903, the Bond & Wiest store was moved to
Cuervo, New Mexico, a small community about fifteen miles
east of Santa Rosa. 12 However, there is evidence to indicate
that the move actually took place in 1902.
9. Records, lac. cit.
10. Ibid.
11. Copy Boak, Sept~mber 10, 1901, p. 185, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
12. The "Old Observer," in describing a visit to the Bond & Wiest store, refers to
its location in '(Cuervito." He also referred, erroneously, to Wiest as "'Mr. Frank Wiest~"
"The Old Observer in New Mexico," The American Shepherd's Bulletin, XI, No.. 6 (June,
1906), 525 (49).
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The move to Cuervo was almost certainly motivated by
the arrival of the railroad which came not through Cabra
but through Tucumcari, Cuervo, and Santa Rosa. 13 The
Bonds were not alone in quickly realizing the advantages to
be gained by establishing themselves in a competitive transportation position, for the Charles Ilfeld Company made a
coincident move in 1904 and established a branch in Santa
Rosa. 14
The Cuervo store was first opened in temporary quarters,15 building construction was begun, and the Cabra store
was closed permanently. The new store building was completed in 1903, and before the year was out the floor space
had to be more than doubled by building a warehouse. This
brought the building investment to $4,827.51 at the end of
December. 16
The profit-sharing arrangement between the Bonds and
Andy Wiest was undisturbed until 1904 when the Bond &
Wiest Corporation was formed with George W. Bond as
president, Frank Bond as vice-president, and Andrew W.
Wiest as secretary and treasurerP "Having incorporated
this new company for the purpose of handling their business
as a corporation rather than as a firm," 18 the new corporation bought the assets of the old firm of G. W. Bond & Bro.
by giving 12,501 shares of stock to Frank Bond, 12,500 to
G. W. Bond, and 24,999 shares to A. W. Wiest. 19 There were
a total of 50,000 shares issued.
13. Interview with J. S. Holbrook.
Belying the present appearance of Cuervo, the prospects and hopes at that time for
expansion of the community are evident from a reference in a letter written by Andy
Wiest in which he referred to the "Gross-KeIIy Addition to the Town of Cuervo." CoW
Book No. 635, p. 352, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
The railroad actuaIIy arrived in Santa Rosa on Christmas Day in
Interview
with C. H. Stearns, Albuquerque, April 12, 1958.
14. COW Book No. 71, August 7, 1902, p. 43 and August 12, 1902, p. 116, in the
Charles Ilfeld Business CoIlection (University of New Mexico Library, Albuquerque),
cited by' William J. Parish, unpublished MS, chap. xi, p. 29.
15. Interview with J. S. Holbrook.
16. Records, loco cit.; Letter of G. W. Bond to Franklin Bond, September 2, 1903,
Bond Papers, loco cit. George always addressed his brother as "Franklin," both oraIly
and in correspondence. He was the only one given this privilege.
17. Minutes of First Stockholders' Meeting, April 21, 1904, Holbrook Papers, loco
cit. Note also that the A. MacArthur Company, Wagon Mound, was organized as a
~orporation just two months later in the same year. Supra, chap. iv.
18. Minutes of Special Meeting, April 21, 1904, Holbrook Papers, lo~. cit.
19. Ibid.

1901.
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This division of the stock gave the Bonds a one-share
control of the company. At the time of incorporation, the
Bonds had an interest in the business of just under $14,000,
including undi;vided profits, and Wiest's comparable interest
amounted to slightly more than $10,000;20 The additional
$15,000 needed by Wiest and the extra $11,000 needed by
the Bonds to take up their respective stock was placed on
the Bond & Wiest books as a receivable. These sums were
carried by the business until 1906 when accumulated profits
of $19,200 were divided and offset against these accounts to
reduce the loans to the stockholders. In 1908 additional accumtllated profits of $27,000 were divided, thus finally enabling Wiest as well as the Bonds to liquidate all debts to the
company.
Until it was finally possible to get rid of the capital dilution that had been introduced at the time of the incorporation, nothing was realized by any of the participants in the
form of profit distribution. Wiest simply drew a store manager's salary of. $75 per month beginning in 1904 which was
raised to $100 in 1905 and to $125 in 1907.21
The above corporate structure stood until 1906 when Joe
Holbrook, Jr., became a stockholder. Holbrook was a native
of Philadelphia whose father operated an Indian commissary
in Cimarron. He had been a sheepherder for a number of
years and then operated a meat market in Wagon Mound
before joining the Bonds at Cabra where he bought sheep,
worked in the store, and ran the post office. 22 The first positive
evidence of his presence is contained in his personal account
which was opened in .December, 1901,23 although one historian dates his arrival several years earlier.2~ His rise, however, in the Bond organization began in 1906 when Andy
Wiest transferred 1,600 l shares of stock to him,25
20. Records. loco cit.

21. Minutes of Board of Directors' Meeting, April 21, 1904, Holbrook Papers, loco
cit. ; ibid.• March 6, 1905 ; ibid., March 4, 1907.
22. Interview with J. S. Holbrook; Davis, op. cit., p. 1631.
23. Ledger, p. 513, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
24. Davis (loc. cit.) writes that· Holbrook went to "Capos [sic] Springs" in 1895 and
bought sheep for G. W. Bond & Bro. The Bonds were probably buying and renting sheep
in the Cabra area that early even though the store was not opened until 1899. but the
dates and sequence of events in Davis' biography are self~contradictonY.
25. Minutes of Board of Directors' Meeting, March 3. 1913, Holbrook Papers. loco cit.
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Andy Wiest's services to the Cuervo store began to be
divided when Archie MacArthur was stricken at Wagon
Mound in 1911 and Wiest began to manage both stores simultaneously. This gave Holbrook the opportunity to prove his
mettle during Wiest's increasingly frequent absences, and
in 1912 he was given deserved recognition by being appointed
assistant general manager, although it is probable that by
this time Wiest was in Wagon Mound so much of the time
that Holbrook was for all practical purposes in complete
charge of the Cuervo operation. His services in this capacity
were apparently well appreciated for at the end of the year
George Bond sent him a bonus of an undisclosed but apparently substantial amount-an action without precedent in
the Bond system. 26
In 1913, Andy Wiest transferred 2,000 more shares of
stock to Holbrook just before a profit distribution,27 The
nature of the conditions under which Wiest transferred his
holdings to Holbrook from time to time are undisclosed,28 but
it was probably a private agreement inasmuch as Wiest and
Holbrook were double brothers-in-law, each having married
the other's sister. 29
By 1912 George Bond was living in Idaho and from a
practical viewpoint his functioning as president was greatly
diminished. He was for this reason dropped from the Board
of Directors,30 and Frank Bond became president, Andy
Wiest was elected vice-president and Holbrook was named
secretary, treasurer, and general manager. 31 The following
year George and Frank Bond each transferred 1,000 shares
of stock to Holbrook,32 and so at the end of 1915 the stockholdings stood as shown in Table 31.
26. Copy Book, January 20, 1913, Holbrook Papers, lac. cit.
27. Minutes of Board of Directors' Meeting, March 3, 1913, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
28. The stockholders' record of April 4, 1910, shows that 24,999 shares were jointly
owned by Wiest and Holbrook. It was not until 1913 that a correction, retroactive to
1906, was made showing Holbrook as owner of any shares in his own right. Ibid.
29. Interviews with J. E. Davenport, J. S. Holbrook, and C. H. Stearns. To further
complicate the family relationships, Holbrook's sister, Emma, married Manuel Paltenghe
at Wagon Mound. Ibid.

30. Records, loco cit.
31. Minutes of Stockholders' Meeting, August 13, 1914, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
32. Minutes of Board af Direetars' Meeting, April 10, 1915, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
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TABLE 31
STOCKHOLpERS, BOND & WIEST, 1915
Name

G. W. Bond
Frank Bond
A. W. Wiest
J. Holbrook, Jr
Total

Shares

:
,
,'

,

. 11,500
. 11,501
.. 21,399
..
5,600
50,000

Throughout the period ending with the close of 1915,
merchandise not only represented the heaviest single investment of Bond & Wiest but also accounted for the largest
single item of profit. The division point on the railroad was
located just a few miles southwest, and the area was prosperous. Cuervo was enjoying a period of expansion; there appears to have been no serious competition in the merchandise
field; and the store was piled high with calico, flour, and all
the traditional inventory of a country store. The trade customarily bought supplies for as long as an entire year at a
time, a heavy inventory of goods was needed to supply their
wants, and wholesale purchases of 10,000 pounds of beans
or 20,000 pounds of potatoes were not uncommon. 33 The yea,r
,end investments and gross profits on merchandise for the
period through 1915 are shown in Table 32.
Sales data for only a few years are available, but they
indicate a rapid rise from $44,230.32 in 1905 to a peak of
almost $96,000 in 1908. 34 By 1912 they had dropped to less
than $61,000, but in 1915 they were back up to about $79,000.
It was not unusual for more than half the sales to be on credit,
and as a result the accounts receivable carried by Bond &
Wiest were a sizable item. They are shown in Table 33. These
book accounts were regarded as being ninety per cent good,
which was a conservative estimate. In fact, the actual loss
was less than 4 per cent in 1912~35
The merchandise business was closely associated with the
railroad, and in the early years Cuervo was a regular stop.
Not only was this an asset by way of widening the marketing
33: Copy Boole, October 12, 1904, p. 135, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
34. Copy Boole, February 11, 1906, p. 553, Holbrook Papers, lQ,c cit. ; Records, we cit.
35. Ibid.
.
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TABLE 32
MERCHANDISE INVENTORY
AND GROSS PROFIT ON MERCHANDISE
BOND & WIEST
(dollars in thousands)
Year

Inventory

Profit

1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

$ 8.1
12.2
12.9
14.4
26.4
25.1
25.6
24.5
20.3
18.9
17.8
17.5
18.5

$. . .
6.9
11.5
10.3

3.8
4.1
4.4
9.4

TABLE 33
BOND & WIEST BOOK ACCOUNTSa
(dollars in thousands)
Amount

Year

1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

.-

,....................................

;................
,................................................
.-.................

.-..............................................

$ 8.7
9.8
13.4
15.1
17.2
11.8
6.5
8.7
8.5
16.6
13.3
17.2
21.3

. area but also it· sharpened the price competition. In 1905
Wiest wrote:
a. The very existence of these credit sales and book accounts lends a puzzling aspect
to Frank Bond's comment to George in 1911 that there was no credit business in Cuervo.
Letter Book No.6, July 8, 1911.
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Profits do not show up as well as last year, yet we sold more
goods, our sales were 37412.00 dollars, accounting for this is
that there is too much strive [sic] for the trade that is tributary to the Rock Island, to hold or get the trade prices have to
be figured very close, we believe we are getting our share.36

The regular train service to Cuervo was discontinued by the
end of 1904,37 but it continued to be a flag stop and as such
provided adequate facilities to the Bonds for mail and merchandise service. However, after December 1,1910, the trains
no longer stopped there at all,38 and the slow strangulation
of Cuervo began. This must have been a source of keen disappointment for railroad accessibility had indeed been the
desideratum when the decision to locate in Cuervo was made
nine years previously. Certainly the effect 'on the merchandise trade is obvious, for after 1910 it began a steady decline.
A number of efforts were made to regain the railroad stop
but without avail. In fact, while mail service did continue on
a drop-and-pick-up basis, it finally deteriorated to ap. intolerable point, and the trains would roar through. town
leaving the pouches on the pick-up arins. 39
Sheep and wool at Cuervo were, of course, th~ important
activities not only because their combined profits were sizable
but also because they were unaffected by the discontinuance
of passenger train service in 1910. In the first year of business Bond & Wiest shipped 309,000 pounds 'of wool, and their
wool purchases for the first half of 1904 amounted to 125,000
pounds. 40 The Tucumcari Wool Scouring Mills were located.
not too far away,41 and doubtless some of the Bond & Wiest
36. Letter of A. W. Wiest to Frank Bond, February 11, 1905, Bond Papers, loco cit.
Wiest seems to have had an aversion to the use of periods .and upper case letters. The
substitution of commas for sentence periods and failure to capitalize first words makes
bis correspondence particularly difficult to read. The Bonds, incidentally, did this
occasionally also, but to a much lesser degree~ Their contemporaries do not now recall
any particular reason for it.
.
37. Copy Book, January 24,1905, p. 260, Holbrook Papers, We. cit.
38. Ibid., December 23, 1910.
39. Copy Book, passim, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
40. Ibid., January 2,1905, p. 289; ibid., July 27, 1904, p. 40.
41. Ibid., June 22, 1905, p. 362; ibid., n.d., p. 388. The Tucumcari Wool Scouring
Company was incorporated in 1904 for $25,000 by E. J. Huling (infra, chap. viii), M. C.
Mechman, and Solomon Floersheim. It had a capacity of 16,000 pounds of wool per day.
The American Shepherd's Bulletin, IX, No.6 (June, 1904), 698 (82).
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wools were shipped there although Brown and Adams· in
Boston were the largest buyers and for many years enjoyed
practically all of the Cuervo business. 42 The hold that Brown
and Adams had on the wools in that area was a source of
some annoyance to Holbrook who, after a visit by Mr. Adams,
was led to remark that Adams thought he had a cinch on the
Cuervo wools "but I will be D [sic] if we consign to him until
we know he has us cornered." 43 Later, of course, much of the
wool business was shifted to Hallowell, Jones, & Donald as
all the Bond business began to drift away from Brown and
Adams. 44
At one time the Bonds had up to 30,000 head of sheep on
the grant lands north of Cuervo,45 but the Bond & Wiest sheep
were of a lesser order. In 1908 Bond & Wiest had 10,000
sheep on the Beck Grant, paying one cent per head per month
rent for grazing,46 but in response to an inquiry Wiest wrote:
We know of no other land this side of the Pecos River where
5,000 head of sheep could be grazed, all available land is being
taken up very rapidly by the homesteaders, this means that the
sheep business in this section will soon be a thing of the past. 47

However, at the end of 1915, Bond & Wiest still had slightly
more than 11,000 sheep, of which 8,800 were on rent. 48
Pertinent investment and profit data on sheep and wool
are shown in Table 34.
A small but lively business was conducted at Cuervo in
hides, pelts, and cattle. Handling of hides and pelts seems
to have begun in 1903 and continued without much change
through 1915. Wiest mentions having over 2,000 pounds of
42.
43.
44.
45,

Letter Book No. 58, June 11, 1915, p. 460.
Copy Bool., July 10, 1913, Holbrook Papers, we. cit.
Letter Book No. 58, June 11, 1915, p. 460.
Copy Book, July 7, 1904, p. 9, Holbrook Papers, we. cit.
46. Copy Book No. 695, January 27, 1909, p. 487, Holbrook Papers, we. cit. Wiest
frequently called it the uCabra Grant."
The rental contract on the grant with J. D. Hand expired in June, 1906, and. the
grant was sold in 1907 to A. A. Jones, so it appears that Bond & Wiest were paying
Jones in 1908 for running sheep on the grant. Copy Book, February io, 1906, p. 550,
Holbrook Papers, we. cit.; supra, PP. 80-81; interview with Harry R. Roberson,
Albuquerque, April 12, 1958.
47. Ibid.
48. Records, loco cit.
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pelts and some goat skins on hand as early as 1904,49 and the
following year Wiest arranged with the G. W. Bond & Bro.
Mercantile Company in Encino to send their hides to Cuervo
for shipment. 50 Wiest handled the hides without charge and
Encino thus· gained a freight rate advantage by shipping
from Cuervo. 51 . In addition, combining their shipments enabled them to confine their shipping to carload lots and thus
take a further freight rate advantage. 52 Wiest pursued this
with some vigor and worked with C. H. Stearns in Santa
Rosa in the same way. 53 Year end investments in hides generally were in the modest range of two to three hundred dollars although at the end of 1906 over $1,000 worth were on
hand. The profit realized was likewise modest, averaging
about $500 a year with the exception of 1905 which doubled
that. 54
TABLE 34
BOND & WIEST SHEEP AND WOOL
(dollars in thousands)
Year

1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

Year-end
Sheep Investment

$ 0.0
2.3
2.2
8.1
2.6
11.1
17.7
15.2
10.3
12.4
20.1
20.8
38.1

Profit
on Sheep

Profit
on Wool

$..

$.
2.8

1.2

3.4
.0

2.2
.0

3.1
5.9
5.0
8.4

3.2
1.4
1.6
1.1

49. Copy Book, July 23, 1904, p. 33; Holbrook Papers, loco cit.
50. Ibid., n.d., p. 544.
51. Ibid.
52. Copy Book No. 695, May 9, 1907, p. 216, Holbrook Papers, lac. cit.
53. Ibid. Stearns operated a general store in Santa Rosa and frequently ran sheep
with Wiest. He recalls selling hides and pelts with Wiest also but had Vorenberg come
down from Wagon Mound to sort and price them first. Interview with C. H. Stearns.
54. Records, loco cit.
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Cattle holdings were sporadic, being insignificant most
of the time. However, there were over $2,000 worth of cattle
in 1909 and slightly less in 1910. At the end of 1915, Bond
& Wiest had 157 head of cattle costing almost $6,000. 55 Profits
on the sale of cattle were insignificant.
Book accounts were carried by Bond & Wiest in amounts
ranging to $17,000, with the balance at the end of 1915 being
slightly more than $21,000. However, cash balances were
adequate at all times, accounts being maintained in both the
Santa Rosa bank and in the bank at EI Paso, Texas, up
through 1912.
Overall profits show that the Cuervo branch was a good
investment, total net profits of the business being as shown
in Table 35.
TABLE 35
BOND & WIEST NET PROFITS
(dollars in thousands)
Year

1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

Amount
c._......................................................................

_........................................................................
".............................................................
,..............
,......................................................
:..........................................................
,.........................
,.............

$ 7.0
12.2
8.3
18.7
13.3
12.2
5.6
5.3
11.8
13.9
14.4
16.7

Notwithstanding the obviously profitable business at
Cuervo, there was early talk of selling out. 56 This first suggestion in 1911 by Wiest was probably sparked by a sudden
necessity for him to spend a great deal of time at Wagon
Mound for prior to that time the general economic outlook in
that area had not been at all dismal. In fact, there had been
talk of expansion some years earlier when it was rumored
that the Bonds were putting in a business at Moriarty57 and
55. Ibid.
56. Letter Book No.6. July 8. 1911.
57. They never did.
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that Gross-Kelly was moving into Willard.58 It was shortly
thereafter that Charles Ilfeld inquired about renting the
store building at Cabra,59 probably with the thought of opening a store. Bond refused.
Even at the same time that Andy Wiest was suggesting
that the Cuervo store be sold, a new industry was invading
Cuervo. The amole plant was being cut, dried in the sun for
sixty days, then shipped east for use in the manufacture of
rope. 60 Wiest did some trading in it; he bought the dried plant
for seven dollars a ton and sold it for eight dollars. 61
The subject of selling out at Cuervo was dropped for the
time being, but Joe Holbrook brought it up again' in 1915.
Frank Bond had no particular objection to selling if Holbrook wanted to, but he didn't believe that Holbrook was
really serious, feeling that the Cuervo store would continue
to pay as well as the other storeS. 62 Holbrook was by this time
discouraged at the declining sheep and wool prospects. Bond .
was sympathetic but noted that despite having exerted every
effort to retain enough ewes in the country to provide flock
increases, the number of sheep was nevertheless dwindling. 63
Harry Kelly went so far as to say that within a short time
there would be no ewes at all in San Miguel County.54
These thoughts were a part of the gloom of the times in
an area which had now started toward the eventual 16ss of
its major industries, but Bond and Wiest were both satisfied
with the showing there,65 and Wiest wanted Holbrook at
Wagon Mound which may have been' contributory to his
wanting to sell. 66 However, Holbrook continued to run the
store, run sheep, buy and sell wool, and all the myriad activi-·
ties devolving upon a Bond manager. Like Frank Bond at Es58. Copy Book, July 11, 1904, p. 11, Holbrook Papers, loco .cit.
59. Ibid., August 30, 1904, p. 87.
60. Letter Book No.6, July 8, 1911.
61. Ibid. The amole plant has detergent properties and its rootstock is normally used
as a substitute for soap. Wiest mentions u rope," however. At the same time he stated his
distrust of dry farmers and said that he would pay them only after the cars were
actually loaded.
62. Letter Book No. 59, August 11, 1915, p. 384.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65: Letter Book No. 56, January 19, 1915, p. 533.
66. Letter Book No.6, January 20,1914.
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panola and like Andy Wiest before him at Cuervo, Holbrook
was active on the District School Board and attended, for
instance, to such miscellaneous matters as trying to get Don
Grabiel [sic] Chavez' son pardoned from the state penitentiary.67 He acted as agent for Henry Posha of German Valley,
Illinois, who owned one of the grants,68 and found a buyer
for two ranches that George Bond owned on the east side of
the Beck Grant. 69 A. H. Long continued to own property in
Cuervo,70 and Joe Holbrook, Jr., doubtless looked after that
property also. His son, J. S. Holbrook, is still in Cuervo and
operates ,the business today.

67. Copy Book. October 18, 1904, p. 152, Holbrook Papers, loco cit.; ibid., July 19,
1911 ; ibid., August 21, 1912.
68. Ibid., March 5, 1913.
69. Ibid., March 7, 1913.
70. Ibid., November 14, 1912. Long had married the daughter of W. R. Lott who had
property holdings in Cuervo also. Interview with H. R. Roberson.

Book Reviews
The Jews of California from the Discovery of Gold until 1880.
By Rudolf Glanz, New York, 1960, with'the help of the
Southern California Jewish Historical Society. Pp. viii,
188.
An introductory chapter, dealing in broad sweeps, whets
the appetite of the reader to the expectation of consuming a
serious, analytical study-an analysis that never quite materializes. What does come forth is a factually packed volume
derived from meticulous combing of primary and other sound
sources. Even so, it is weakened by the repetitiousness of
similar fact, much of which could have been avoided by a
more balanced grouping of imaginative topics. The last eleven
of the book's fifteen chapters, comprising but one-third of
the pages, but embracing important and promising subjects,
suggest the opportunities that were available to the author.
The heavy concentration of Jews in San Francisco with
the flower of their mercantile interests dominating smaller
economic communities, including Los Angeles, is recognized
frequently by the author but is not developed as a thesis. The
permanent residence Of these people is a matter of occasional
comment. Yet what would seem to follow, a major contribution to the cultural life of the communities, is seldom approached with a positive flavor.
If, in spite of the introductory chapter, the author had
meant to limit his objective to a simple descriptive but factually accurate story, the book could be read much less critically. It would have been helpful in any case, however, if a
preface setting forth these limits of treatment had been written, and if an index and bibliography had been constructed.
It is evident that Dr. Glanz has uncovered, for this study,
adequate' factual material which, if coupled with his known
rich background in Jewish cultural history, should have produced a more expansive and significant analysis of Jewish
contributions to the early development of California.
WM. J. PARISH
University of New Mexico
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Indians, Infants and Infantry .. Andrew and Elizabeth .Burt
on the Frontier. By Merrill J. Mattes. Denver: The Old
West Publishing Company, 1960. Preface, end-plate
maps, illustrations, index. Pp. 304. $5.95.
By and large, the last frontier was a man's frontier. The
fur trapper, the miner and the cowboy found it so, and until
the "sodbuster" brought in his family to till the land women
were mighty scarce articles. The ordinary soldier, in his
grim, louse-infested barracks, was aware of this ugly truth.
He knew that "rank has its privileges," one of which was
that of the officers to bring their wives and children to the
lonely outposts that stood forlornly against the western backdrop. Occasionally these frontierswomen sought to escape
from thk tedium of army post life by keeping journals in
which' tHey noted the things that interested them. Elizabeth
Burt, wife of career officer Andrew Burt, was one of them,
and through her eyes we see another side of army life.
The diaries kept by Elizabeth Burt have been lost, but a
good deal of the information they contained went into a
reminiscence she wrote in 1912. The important thing about
this writing is that it was done with the diaries before her,
setting it apart from many other frontier recollections that
depend upon memory. Her manuscript, "An Army Wife's
Forty Years in the Service," covered most of her fifty-three
year marriage to Burt, but of particular interest to historians of the plains West is the fact that over half of it dealt
with the crucial years 1866-1876.
Elizabeth Burt's story not only supplements a good deal
of the information already known to historians, but it adds
to that side of western life of which so little has been written:
the woman's view, family life. Merrill Mattes has done a
great deal with his materials at hand, carefully supplementing the document with lengthy explanatory discourses that
fill any gaps and make the whole fabric not only good reading
but entirely useful as a contribution to western history.
Through this intelligent and observant woman's eyes, one
follows the family to Fort Kearny, Nebraska, in the critical
year, 1866, and on to Fort Bridger in southwestern Wyo-
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ming, followed closely by an assignment to Fort C. F. Smith,
on the southern Montana segment of the Bozeman Trail.
Here the Burts moved into Red Cloud's country at a time
when that famous road w.as under siege hy the Sioux, and
Fort Smith, so little known in history, comes to life at the
hands of an army wife who not only followed her husband to
this distant outpost'but took along a small baby. This is the
heart of the book, the zenith of Mrs. Burt's military experience,and its words are a bonanza to both historian and lay
reader. There is an excellent account of leaving the Fort
when the Bozeman Trail posts were given up by the army in
1868.
From 1874 to 1876 the Burts were at Fort Laramie,
again finding themselves in the center of events that led to
the climax at the Little Big Horn in the latter year. One
does not find here the usual portrayal of these significant
military actions, but instead the richness of experience related by one who waited nearby, saw the coming and going
of the troops, and watched· anxiously for word from the
front. Mrs. Burt might be said to have been sitting in the
bleachers, but it takes nothing away from the excitement of
events transpiring on the field of action. Her story well complements the many published stories of what happened on the
field of battle. No major work about the days of the Indian
fighting army will be written now without reference to this
valuable contribution Merrill Mattes has provided.
University of Colorado
ROBERT G. ATHEARN
VictorUino Huerta: A Reappraisal. William L. Sherman 'and
Richard E. Greenleaf. Mexico, D. F.: Imprenta Aldirw"

1960. Distributed by The Mexico City College Press.
Pp.164.
For two reasons, this reviewer has approached this book
with what may be something less than an objective state of
mind. One reason is that, in his opinion, on a list of Latin
American historical figures for whom biographies are "long
overdue," Victoriano Huerta should be comfortably entrenched, preferably buried, near or at the bottom. He might
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be worth a footnote by way of reinstatement of character;
he could conceivably be stretched to article-length treatment.
by dint of painstaking research and careful presentation.
In book-length treatment, this reviewer finds his career insufferably dull, his mind a vacuum, his physical courage a
far too common and misdirected quality· to be interesting,
and his family life approximating that of a Mexican Babbitt.
Secondly, the reviewer holds an aversion toward published works resting heavily upon secondary sources. Such
works oblige one to wade through masses of material already
(and recently) in print in English in order to grasp the "new
contribution" presumably embedded in this reworked ore,
whether in the form of "new-fact" nuggets or in what purports to be reinterpretation. He regrets to report that after
reading this book both his prejudices have been deepened.
The fault with this work is not in the way in which it is
written. The authors demonstrate considerable skill in synthesizing; their quotations are often well chosen and are
revealing cameos of Mexico during the Revolution. The fault
lies rather in the reasoning of the authors as to why Huerta
should be reappraised, the readers to whom such reappraisal
should be addressed, and the proper limitations of the reappraisal given the use of limited sources.
Huerta has been maliciously defamed by propagandists
of the Mexico Revolution, whose outpourings have been uncritically absorbed (the false Huerta is far more interesting
than the real one) by semipopular writers in the United
States. The authors of this work feel that the scholarly world
should be informed that Huerta was, after all, human. He
was not a drunkard for he held his liquor well; he did not
take dope or indulge in sexual orgies. This reviewer makes
the assumption that only the casual reader of textbook level
status is in need of this reminder. The book, however, carries
the baggage of footnotes, conventional historical style, and
bibliography-the appendages but not the content (due to
lack of depth in research) -of genuine scholarship. It thereby has been misconceived for it is neither popular nor scholarly.
As to the limitations of their work, the authors proceed

248

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

to pass judgment on far more serious matters than Huerta's
character-a task for which the amount of research done ill
equips them to do. The question of the exact relationship of
a man to an event as profound and complex as the Mexican
Revolution is a matter requiring the most detailed study.
It is, in short, assessing the role of the political leader within
the context of multiple impersonal forces. Given the several
forces of discontent unleashed by,1910, no leader could command a peaceful, progressive Mexico until other impersonal
forces came to his aid. The authors seem to think differently.
Despite references to Charles Cumberland's work (Mexican
Revolution: Genesis Under Madero, Austin, 1952), they
adopt a pre-Cumberland view of Madero, selecting for citation quotations concerning Madero's personal shortcomings,
and justifying the coup of 1913 against him on the grounds
that the administration was, after all, weak, and that the
most powerful elements of society were agitating for a
change. They conclude that it is "more or less certain that his
administration would not have remained in power for a full
term, regardless of Victoriano Huerta" (p. 73). In other
words, Madero simply could not maintain peace and order
and at the same time satisfy discontented elements. Concerning the conservative coup of 1913 (where the authors omit
mentioning that Huerta made no convincing efforts to assault
the Ciudadela and used reinforcements on useless military
objectives), the picture presented by the authors is one of a
much-needed restorer of peace and order who has become,
by some miraculous metamorphosis, a social reformer desirous of advancing the. land reform program if Mexican discontents and Woodrow Wilson would only let him alone.
This thesis is supported by extremely thin evidence. As to
Huerta's success in restoring law and order, the authors do
observe that 'revolts by Carranza and Zapata were never
suppressed. They use, however, a comment by the American
diplomat's wife, Mrs. O'Shaughnessy (p. 110), to support
the contention that elsewhere brigandage and small-scale
revolts had been put down. It seems unlikely that Mrs.
O'Shaughnessy, or any other person residing in Mexico City,
could know this by other than hearsay. The fact that Huerta,
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previously innocent of ideas, stated that he would create aMinistry of Agriculture devoted in part to land distribution
(p. 109) does not make him a social reformer. The authors
fail to observe that Huerta's conservative support rested
exactly on the supposition that he would not carry out a program of this kind. It is, furthermore, illogical to contend that
Huerta would have been able to restore peace and would have
advanced the Revolution if revolts had stopped and Wilson's
intervention had been withdrawn, and, at the same time, to
contend that the reason Madero could not do these things
was because he was weak and could not maintain control,
thus justifying a coup -against him. Actually both Madero
and Huerta·were trying unsuccessfully to ride the wild horse
of Revolution. Both failed. If Madero had the advantage of
non-intervention by the United States, Huerta had the advantage of conservative support; but neither of these advantages could offset the rising tide of the Revolution. The
personalities of the respective leaders had very little to do
with the course of events.
Despite a tendency toward many short sentences in succession which create, at times, a monotonous effect, this book
is written in crisp prose embellished by a number of wellturned phrases. There are, however, a few non sequiturs and
occasional vaguenesses. In a summation of pre-revolutionary
discontent including strikes, examples of subversive literature, and Madero's political activities, the authors conclude:
"The government suddenly realized that the mild little agitator, Madero, had created a monster which eyed hungrily
the National Palace in Mexico City" (p. 20). The reader has
hardly been prepared for this sweeping evaluation of Madero's influence. The meaning of the statement that "Huerta's
seizure of power was little more than a fait accompli . • .
(the remainder of the sentence deals with another thought)
leaves this reviewer completely mystified.
The book is cleanly edited with scrupulous accuracy in
the accentuation of Spanish words; apotheoistic (p. 45),
however, does not appear in the dictionary. There are one or
two misplaced relative pronouns and a dependent clause (p.
12) is set aside by a semicolon as though it were independent.
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Sources are occasionally Cited uncritically. Aside from
the question of historical importance, Huerta did not die
poor simply because Samuel F. Bemis "states flatly" (p. 115)
that it is so. He probably did die poor, but Professor Bemis
stands at a respectable distance from intimate knowledge of
this matter. There remains the fact that the great bulk of
this book simply recounts what has already appeared in
English. This reviewer is not enlightened to reread Howard
Cline's (The United States and Mexico, Cambridge, 1953)
educated sneers at Wilsonian idealism in paraphrased form
in the last chapter. There are citations of several Masters'
theses written at Mexico City College. ,Their content, however, has apparently not been utilized; the footnotes merely
announce their existence.
Except for the reappraisal of Huerta's character, which
might have been done in one-tenth the space, this work merely
rearranges the topsoil of the Mexican Revolution in an unconvincing pattern. The a.uthors have embarked upon a
course without the necessary ballast.
University of New Mexico
TROY S. FLOYD

The Gila Trail: The Texas Argonauts and the California
Gold Rush. By Benjamin Butler Harris. Edited and annotated by Richard H. Dillon. (American Exploration and
Travel Series, Volume 31.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. Pp. ix, 175. Map, illustrations, notes,
appendix, bibliographical note and index. $4.00.
The editor contends that Benjamin Butler Harris's reminiscence of his experience on the, Gila Trail and in the California gold fields is worthy of publication on the basis of
interest, color, readability, and new information added to the
meager knowledge available concerning the experiences of
gold seekers over the Gila route. The editor is correct'in his
contention. Harris, a practicing attorney, was well educated,
an intelligent observer, a humorist worthy of note and a
writer of ability. His account is well worth the attention of
readers who desire to be entertained as well as those who
seek historical information.
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Harris left Panola County, Texas, on March 25, 1849, to
join the party of Isaac H. Duval who was in charge of one of
the earliest groups from Texas to travel to the California
gold fields. The party journeyed to El Paso and then looped
southward across northern Chihuahua before passing
through Tucson, Yuma and Tejon to complete their journey
at Sonora on September 29, 1849.
The carefully prepared editorial notes generally complement the narrative; however, two important points should
be clarified. Harris tells (114-119) an interesting and an
amusing account of acquiring, a turpentine topknot while
sleeping under a resinous pine tree. The pound ball of turpentine clung annoyingly to his hair for days because he
could not find scissors to cut it away. "Then bowie and pocket
knives were tried but their rough edges proved too tedious
and painful (114)." He even moved to another camp before
he found a pair of scissors..
. The editor should have recognized this as a good story
and nothing more. On the frontier, a man's life could depend
on a sharp knife and in an environment where it was not unknown for an individual to amputate one of his own limbs,
it is hard to conceive of Harris being squeamish about having
someone cut a ball of pine tar out of his hair with a knife.
Harris says (103), "A peculiarity of the atmosphere at
this season was its magnifying properties under certain conditions and situations." The editor states (note 113), "Perhaps this will explain (even excuse) the tendency of Californians . . . to exaggerate." The editor is naive in not recognizing exaggeration to be a more fundamental characteristic than something induced by a peculiarity of the atmosphere and is lax in not pointing out specific instances of exexaggeration.
That Chief Gomez (110) had two thousand warriors is
certainly an overstatement. The footnote (4) implies that
this number may have been two hundred, but it is not clear.
A war party of four hundred Apaches (67,69) was possible.
The editor should have questioned (79, note 72) that "More
than once [Tucson] has been invested by from one to two
thousand Indians . . ."
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The editors Foreword and Dramatis Personre might have
been more carefully presented. The statement that the "Sooners" of the California Gold Rush (ix) were Texans should
have been more substantially supported. This contention is
contradicted by the statement (3) that "Their companions
on the trail were simple, restless and rootless men from all
corners and strata of North America." The reader is left to
wonder if they became Texans by simply passing through
Texas. The statement that Harris's companions were simple,
restless or rootless is contradicted by the editor's admission
(14) that little is known about the rest of the Duval party.
"At this, I laid from my belt by two duelling pistols . . ."
(107) should read my instead of by. Damned (29, note 4)
should be dammed since it refers to impounding a body of
water rather than dooming to everlasting punishment.
VICTOR WESTPHALL
Albuquerque, N. M.
End of Track. By James H. Kyner as told to Hawthorne
Daniel. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960. Pp.
280. Notes. $1.60.
The University of Nebraska Press, launching a new series
of paper bound volumes called Bison Books, has wisely
chosen to reprint this autobiography, originally issued in
1937 by the Caxton Printers. The present edition, well made,
sets an excellent physical standard for the volumes to come.
The book itself is absorbing reading. It begins with Kyner's
youth as the son of a village innkeeper in Ohio, depicting an
attractive kind of rural life now long vanished from America.
His idyllic situation was shattered by the Civil War, in which
he served as a young volunteer. His account of how he fought
and was wounded in the Battle of Shiloh vividly shows just
what must have happened to many a simple rural lad in the
early clashes of the conflict. After the war Kyner farmed, was
in the insurance business and eventually won a seat in the
Nebraska legislature, where for four years he so successfully
blocked anti-railroad legislation that the Union Pacific
abruptly, unexpectedly rewarded him with a contract to
build a twenty-five mile branch line within the state. He had
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no experience or capital, but managed to execute the task
successfully and make a profit of $10,000. He went on to build '
or refurbish many miles of track in Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming, Iowa and Ohio. Bankrupted in the panic of 1893, he
started again with nothing and made enough to retire from
railroading in 1901 with a comfortable fortune.
Kyner's account of his experiences as a railroad contractor is unique; there is no comparable document. He relates
the exciting things, the tribulations and the general techniques in pages interesting for the general reader but frustrating to the specialist eager for the details which only such
an expert as he c'ould have supplied. In sweeping strokes he
depicts the era when railroads pioneered through the unsettled west, when men of pragmatic enterprise achieved great
works and secured large fortunes. Most of the areas where
Kyner built were sparsely populated, lawless and in many
ways uncivilized. As serious history, this autobiography of a
railroad frontiersman is much better in setting the general
scene than giving the details; as interesting reading, it is
superior.
University of Idaho
WILLIAM S. GREEVER'

The Maxwell Land Grant. By Jim Berry Pearson. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1961. Pp.xiv, 305. $5.00.
\

.

The many histories of the famous Maxwell Land Grant
have usually stressed the way in which Carlos Beaubien and
Guadalupe Miranda, its original recipients, managed to acquire such a huge two million acre tract from Governor
Armijo in 1843. Then they treat the lordly manner in which
Lucien B.' Maxwell, who became the Grant's owner for a
time, lived on his vast estate and dispensed lavish frontier
hospitality to all comers. After Maxwell agreed to sell the
property in 1869 to a syndicate of Colorado and British promoters backed by Dutch capital, the Grant's history is usually
depicted as a saga of sophisticated financial chicanery practiced by the Maxwell Land Grant and Railroad Company as
they promoted fraudulent stock sales abroad and exploited
the company property at home. This robber-baron, big-
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business aspect of the Grant's history has been reinforced
by many colorful. accounts of the violent and often tragic
war between settlers who felt the Grant was public domain
and the Company who insisted-sometimes at guppointthat it was not.
All these standard items and many more appear in Dr.
Jim Berry Pearson's fact-studded and often entertaining
book. But this study is far more than a rehash of a familiar
story. Intrigued by placer mining scars oIl.; the side of Baldy
Mountain and curious about the few remaining buildings
of the once prosperous mining community of Elizabethtown,
the author at first sought to uncover the mining history of
Colfax County. But this search led him into a study of the
Maxwell Company itself since it owned the region and many
of its enterprises centered on mining.. What has emerged is
an unusually detailed history of the Company from its beginnings down to the present decade, in essense a study of
large-scale corporate endeavor on the frontier. Dr. Pearson's
fresh version is all the more valuable since he had access to
the Company records which have been lying undisturbed in
the vault of the First National Bank of Raton for some years.
Consisting of account books, minutes of meetings, annual
reports, scrapbooks and letters, these sources-supplemented
by local newspapers-enabled Dr. Pearson to make a thorough economic case study of the Company somewhat on the
order of Herbert O. Brayer's monumental history of William
Blackmore's western enterprises. The Maxwell Land Grant
also represents /another sure step in the direction of recovering New Mexico's past economic history, a task in which
Dean William J. Parish, Max Moorhead, and Brayer have
already pioneered.
Dr. Pearson's account is far from a straight business
history, however, for he provides a readable but intelligent
summary of Lucien Maxwell's career, a history of the brieflived but roaring community of Elizabethtown, and a p,etailed rendition of the deadly activities of gunmen like "Wall"
Henderson and Clay Allison,' as well as of crusaders like the
rambunctious Reverend O. P. McMains. Nevertheless his
chief contributions lie in a coverage of mining and Company
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history. He establishes the importance of mining in fostering
the Grant's development even though the gold extracted seldompaid large sums. Quite the reverse, the cost of mining
it often bankrupted its investors. At the same time he uses
facts and figures to cut the legendary stories about the Aztec
and Montezuma mines down to size. In discussing the Com- .
pany's other wide-ranging enterprises on the Grant-a coal
and coke company, irrigation projects, a cement factory,
ranching and railroad building-he finds that these efforts
also met with relatively limited success.
Such failures are explained in large part by the unending
struggle lasting to 1887, to secure valid title to the Grant,
to eject squatters, and to find capital. But the real cause of
failure lay in the Company itself which was torn by warring
factions among the directors, feuds between the British promoters and the Dutch mortgage holders, and a lack of understanding between the local managers of the property and its
absentee owners. And lastly, the presence of speculators who
periodically raided the Company's assets resulted in a crushing bonded indebtedness and receivership. The author finds
this struggle continuing right into the twentieth century until
the Amsterdam bondholders finally assumed full control of
the property.
By carefully avoiding moral judgments and by the use of
a historical perspective which O. P. McMains and his antiGrant settlers could never have acquired, Dr. Pearson is able
to conclude his-study on a somewhat positive note:
Despite . . . constant dissension the land grant company
initiated projects for developing the area's resources. Its officials sought to bring in railroads, mined and marketed coal,
operated a cement factory, constructed two expensive irrigation projects, experimented with various crops, mined gold and
silver, ran herds of cattle, leased rich stands of timber, and
sold off the property in both large and small tracts.

The Maxwell Land Grant is so generally thorough and
objective in its coverage that only one major omission deserves comment. Every observer in nineteenth century New
Mexico noted that little could be done in the territory with-
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out the sanction or collaboration of the clique of lawyers and
businessmen called the Santa Fe Ring. Yet the role of the
Ring in Colfax County politics and in the Company's history
is never made clear in this book. If the relations of Probate
Judge Dr. R. H. Longwill, Attorney M. W. Mills, and Frank
Springer with the Ring could be spelled out, the real reason
for attaching Colfax County to Taos during Governor Axtell's administration might be less obscure than it appears
here. It rather looks as if the Company managers were fighting Tom Catron and the Ring just then and the attachmen~
was a legal method to embarrass or even seize the Company.
The role of Judge L. B. Prince and several others in rendering
certain favorable decisions for the Company is not treated;
and finally, the reason for choosing W. T. Thornton, law
partner to Catron, as receiver for the Company in 1880
might have been explored. Such inclusions would have given
better focus to the Grant's role in New Mexican political
history.,
On the level of minor criticism this reviewer unhappily
found several instances of poor proof reading. Dr. R. H.
Longwill, or so spelled in Twitchell; becomes Longwell in this
volume. Melvin W; -Mills also appears as Marvin W. Mills,
while Wilson Waddingham is on one occasion "Waddington"
and George M. Pullman is "George H." These errors and the
fact that the University of Oklahoma Press omitted pages
99 to 115 in this reviewer's copy mar a clear, readable, thoroughly researched and documented history of the Maxwell
Land Grant, its owners, enterprises, and opponents. The
book is well illustrated with many photographs of Grant
figures and scenes.
Yale University

HOWARD R.·LAMAR

